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INTRODUCTION

The Department of Justice (DOJ) faces difficulties tackling child
pornography websites hosted on services such as The Onion Router
(TOR) because these services obscure the identities-namely the Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses-of visitors and hosts of suspicious websites.1
TOR conceals user identities through the employment of a worldwide
network of volunteer-operated servers, which direct traffic not in a straight
line from user to website, but across a multitude of servers, ultimately
masking a user's true IP address behind the IP address of the "exit node"
along the chain of volunteer computers. 2
Law enforcement agents routinely use software to uncover IP addresses
of individuals that access or share child pornography on other file-sharing
platforms,3 and courts generally agree an IP address sufficiently identifies a

1.

See Mythili Raman, Comment to the Honorable Reena Raggi (Sept. 18, 2013), in ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES, MATERIALS FOR APRIL 7-8, 2014 MEETING, 171-75 (2014),
availabl
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-

rules-criminal-procedure-april-2014 [https://perma.cc/CMR9-HVSS].
2.

See

Tor

Overview,

perma.cc/QLK8-EK9]

TOR,

("To create

https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en

[https://

a private network pathway with Tor, the user's software or client

incrementally builds a circuit of encrypted connections through relays on the network.

The circuit is

extended one hop at a time, and each relay along the way knows only which relay gave it data and
which relay it is giving data to.").

3.

See United States v. Thomas, 788 F.3d 345, 347-48 (2d Cir. 2015) ("As part of the

investigation, law enforcement relied upon automated software programs to help locate Internet
Protocol

('IP')

addresses engaged in the possession and distribution of child pornography."), cert.

denied, 136 S. Ct. 848 (2016); United States v. Brashear, No. 4:11-CR-0062, 2013 WL 6065326, at *1

(M.D. Pa.

Nov. 18, 2013) (describing law enforcement use of software program "RoundUp" to scan

files across the "Gnutella peer-to-peer file sharing network" for "hash values" related to known child

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss1/4
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suspect's computer for the purpose of issuing a search warrant at a
physical residence.4 TOR, however, poses an exceptional challenge to law
enforcement by denying capture of IP addresses; even after identifying the
server hosting a TOR website, the website's logs do not reveal the true
identities of any of its visitors.5 In response to the challenge of anonymity
used to further crimes online, government agencies have increasingly
turned to remote access technology beginning at least as early as 1998.'
In 2012, the FBI launched its first major operation against child
pornography websites using a Network Investigatory Technique (NIT),
the FBI's term for their hacking tool.8 "Operation Torpedo" 9 began with

pornography).

4.

See United States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 2007) (attaching a suspect IP address

to a physical residence via Internet service provider records furnishes the requisite probable cause to
secure a search warrant because a "substantial basis [exists] to conclude that evidence of criminal
activity w[ill] be found at [the location]"); see also United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 279
(1st Cir. 2012)

("[T]he

magistrate made a sensible determination . .

that a search of the defendants

residence was likely to turn up illicit images."); United States v. Renigar, 613 F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir.
2010) (noting there was sufficient information to lead "a person of reasonable caution" to conclude
that evidence of child pornography "would be found at the residen[ce] . .
in question"); United

States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding the search warrant supported a
conclusion that evidence of child pornography would be found at the defendants apartment).
5. See Brad Heath, FBI Ran Website Sharing Thousands of Child Porn Images, USA TODAY

Jan. 21, 2016, 12:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/01/21/fbi-ran-websitesharing-thousands-child-porn-images/79108346 [https://perma.cc/8T4X-KR4F] ("When the FBI
first realized it could break through Tor," Ron Hosko, former assistant director of the FBI's Criminal
Investigative Division, "said the agency gathered counterterrorism investigators and intelligence
agencies to see if any of them had a more pressing need for the software.").
6.

See Kim Zetter, Everything We Know About How the FBI Hacks People, WIRED (May 15, 2016,

7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/history-fbis-hacking

[https://perma.cc/5H58-3W44]

(providing a history of the FBI's publicly known instances of deploying remote access technology).
7. See Heath, supra note 5 (detailing the 2012 FBI takeover of three child pornography websites
resulting in twenty-five indictments).
8.

See Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Memorandum to the Honorable John F. Keenan (Feb. 7, 2014),

in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES, MATERIALS FOR APRIL 7-8, 2014 MEETING,
245 n.1 (2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisorycommittee-rules-criminal-procedure-april-2014

[https://perma.cc/7H64-PTV7]

(calling attention to

the use of the term "hacking" to describe the governments network investigatory technique).
Department of Justice takes umbrage with the term hacking because

"[t]he

The

Merriam-Webster

Dictionary definition of a hacker is 'a person who illegally gains access to and sometimes tampers
with information in a computer system[,]'
gain computer access.

Wroblewski, supra.

whereas the government here seeks lawful authority to
In response, Orin Kerr noted the "primary definition

provided by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary is 'a person who secretly gets access to a computer
system in order to get information, cause damage,"' and the definition selected by Wroblewski "is
only the fifth and last alternative definition of the word hacker."

Orin Kerr, Memorandum

to

Members of the Rule 41 Subcomm. (Feb. 8, 2014), in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES,
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the arrest of Aaron McGrath, alleged host of three child pornography
websites once available through TOR.1 o The FBI sought and received a
search warrant to install a NIT onto one of McGrath's websites," which
the agency then allowed to operate for three weeks while it monitored
activity.1 2 The operation "de-anonymized" twenty-five individuals and
resulted in nineteen convictions.1
Unsuspecting users of the website
downloaded the NIT alongside their desired file,1 4 which communicated
to FBI agents the user's "actual IP address" and its "type of operating
system[,] .

.

. version[,] .

.

. and architecture[.]""s

Defense attorneys lost

their efforts to suppress evidence of the NIT search.1 6 However, in legal
challenges to the search warrant, defense attorneys did not argue the
warrant lacked particularity or violated the jurisdictional requirement of
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; rather, they argued
the FBI failed to give proper notice to defendants under Rule 41(f)(3).1

MATERIALS FOR APRIL 7-8, 2014 MEETING 253 n.1, available at http: //www.uscourts.gov/ rules-

policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-criminal-procedure-april-2014
[https://
perma.cc/7H64-PTV7]. The Government also bristles at the term malware. See United States v.

Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 927 n.7 (W.D. Ark. 2016) ("Agent Aflin objects to describing the NIT as
malware, because the term has a derogatory connotation . . . . Nevertheless, Agent Aflin concedes
that when used as a term of art to explain an ethical hacking technique used by law enforcement, the
term malware is descriptive of the NIT used here.").
9. See Zetter, supra note 6 (describing Operation Torpedo as a "sting operation" which aimed
to reveal visitors attempting to mask their identity).
10.

See Application for a Search Warrant at 19, United States v. Cottom, No. 8:13CR108

8:15CR239, 2015 WL 9308226 (D. Neb. Dec. 22, 2015) (revealing McGrath as "Administrator" of
the target websites).
11.

Search and Seizure Warrant at 3, United States v. Cottom, No. 8:13CR108 8:15CR239,

2015 WL 9308226 (D. Neb. Dec. 22, 2015).
12. United States v. Doe, No. 8:13CR107, 2014 WL 5456531, at *1 (D. Neb. Oct. 27, 2014)
(describing what is commonly known as a watering-hole attack).
13. Patrick Howell O'Neill, Former Tor Developer Created alware for the FBI to Hack Tor Users,
DAILY DOT (Apr. 27, 2016, 9:32 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/government-contractor-tor-

malware [https://perma.cc/RD82-EFBC].
14.

See NIT Forensic and Reverse Eng'g Report, Continued from Jan. 2015 at 17, United

States v. Cottom, No. 8:13CR108 8:15CR239, 2015 WL 9308226 (D. Neb. Dec. 22, 2015) ("When an
end user accessed a page on a website where the NIT was installed, the NIT code would be se[n]t to
the end user[]s computer along with the images/text/content that made up the web page.").
15. Application for a Search Warrant at 32, United States v. Cottom, No. 8:13CR108

8:15CR239, 2015 WL 9308226 (D. Neb. Dec. 22, 2015).
16.

See Memorandum and Order at 10, United States v. Cottom, No. 8:13CR108 8:15CR239,

2015 WL 9308226 (D. Neb. Dec. 22, 2015) (compiling and denying fifteen defendants' attempts to
suppress evidence seized via NIT in Operation Torpedo).

17. Memorandum and Order at 7-8, United States v. Cottom, No. 8:13CR108 8:15CR239,
2015 WL 9308226 (D. Neb. Dec. 22, 2015).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss1/4
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Although the Federal Government faced little challenge for the NIT's
deployment in "Operation Torpedo" cases, United States Magistrate
Judge Stephen Wm. Smith issued a surprising ruling in an unrelated case
that called into question the FBI and DOJ's strategy for future remote
access searches.1 '
In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises
Unknown" pertained to an email user who unlawfully accessed another
individual's email inbox in order to invade and transfer money out of that
person's bank account;2 0 however, the suspect could not be identified
because they utilized a proxy server to hide their true IP address.2 1
Judge Smith noted the issue to be addressed-whether to approve "a
[search] warrant to hack a computer suspected of criminal use" 2 2
appeared to be one of first impression in any federal district.2
He
ultimately held, "Since the current location of the Target Computer is
unknown, it necessarily follows that the current location of the
information on the Target Computer is also unknown. This means that
the Government's application cannot satisfy the territorial limits of
Rule 41(b)(1)." 2 4 Judge Smith denied the warrant, but recognized, "This is

18.

See generaly In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp.

2d 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (suppressing evidence of a search in which the government deployed remote
access technology to identify an individual suspected of federal bank fraud due to the search
warrants lack of particularity and violation of Rule 41(b)).
19.

In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753

(S.D. Tex. 2013).
20. Id. at 755.
21. Id.
22.

Id.

23. See id. at 756 n.2 (noting although no published opinions exist, a magistrate judge in
Washington authorized a similar warrant which aimed to identify the person issuing bomb threats at
a high school). Also addressed in the opinion, the Electronic Freedom Foundation submitted a
FOIA request to the FBI following the Washington bomb threat, which resulted in a number of
documents detailing the regular use of an electronic surveillance tool called 'Computer and Internet
Protocol Address Verifier' (CIPAV)." Id. at 759 n.10; see also Jennifer Lynch, New FBI Documents
Provide Details on Governments Surveillance Spyware, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND (Apr. 29, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/new-fbi-documents-show-depth-government
[https://perma.cc/GUW9-UWN9] (providing an analysis of the full FOIA return).
24. In re Warrant to Search, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 757. The case also turned on lack of particularity
because the Government application provided only "indirect and conclusory assurance" that the
correct person would ultimately be targeted by the NIT.

Id. at 759

("[The

Government [fails to]

explain how it will ensure that only those 'committing the illegal activity will be . . . subject to the
technology."'). The last issue addressed was the Governments failure to meet the requisite burden
for video surveillance using a NIT-where the FBI sought to remotely access the subjects computer
camera-because

the application again offered conclusory statements to show they exhausted

alternatives to video surveillance and exerted an effort at minimization. Id. at 760. Of note, the FBI

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
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not to say that such a potent investigative technique could never be
authorized under Rule 41. And there may well be a good reason to update
the territorial limits of that rule in light of advancing computer search
technology." 2 5
Rule 41(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure defines the
territorial limitations of a magistrate judge when issuing criminal search
warrants:
At the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the
government: . . a magistrate judge with authority in the district-or if none
is reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record in the district-has
authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person orproperty located
althin the distric4.]2 6
Rule 41(b) contains multiple exceptions that confer authority on a
magistrate judge to issue search warrants outside of their district, including
when property, once located within the district, moves outside of the
district after a warrant has issued,2 7 investigations of terrorism, 28
installation of a tracking device on property located within the district but
that may move outside at some point during the investigation, 2 9 and to
searches of property outside of the fifty states, but inside United States
territory, or property of diplomatic and consular missions.3 o
In response to In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer, the DOJ began
the process of amending Rule 41(b) to provide another exemption for two

requested much greater control over the individual's computer in In re Warrant to Search a Target
Computer than in "Operation Torpedo" or "Operation Pacifier." Compare id. at 755-56 (requesting
authority to seize IP addresses, records of Internet activity, logged user names and passwords,
documents, email contents, photographs, and control over the computer's built-in camera), with
Application for a Search Warrant at 40, United States v. Cottom, No. 8:13CR108 8:15CR239,

2015 WL 9308226 (D. Neb. Dec. 22, 2015) (applying for the Operation Torpedo warrant to seize
target computers' IP addresses and determine their operating system), and Search and Seizure
Warrant at 2, United States v. Lorente, No. 2:15-CR-00274 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2016) (attaching as
an exhibit the search warrant affidavit in Operation Pacifier, petitioning the magistrate to authorize
the seizure of a site visitor's IP address, operating system, Host Name, operating system username,
and media access control (MAC) address).
25.

In re Warrant to Search, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 761.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

FED.
Id. R.
Id. R.
Id. R.
Id. R.

R. CRIM. P. 41 (b) (1) (emphasis added).
41(b)(2).
41(b)(3).
41(b)(4).
41(b)(5).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss1/4
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specific situations faced in the Internet age.3 1 The DOJ requested the
following addition to Rule 41(b) in a letter to the Advisory Committee on
the Criminal Rules on September 18, 2013:
[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities related to a
crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant, to be executed via
remote access, for electronic storage media or electronically stored
information located mithin or outside that district. 2

The DOJ illustrated two situations that demanded the change: (1) a
situation where the district in which the device is located is concealed
through anonymization technology, and (2) to investigate cyber-attacks
that infect and seize control over computers in a number of districts, then
employ the victimized computers to carry out the attack.3 3 Judge Raggi,
Chair of the Committee, formed a Subcommittee on Rule 41 to review the
suggested change, eventually approving the amendment after minor edits
and adding explicit language for the two situations proposed by the
DOJ.
31. See Mythili Raman, Letter to the Honorable Reena Raggi, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL RULES, MATERIALS FOR APRIL 7-8, 2014 MEETING 171-172 (2014), availabk at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-criminalprocedure-april-2014 [https://perma.cc/7H64-PTV7] (pointing to In re Search Warrant as a situation
where underlying facts met Fourth Amendment standards, but not the requirements of Rule 41(b)).
32. Id. at 173 (emphasis added). The DOJ also requested a change to the notice provision

within Rule 41(f(1)(C), which was ultimately adopted:
In a case involving a warrant for remote access to electronic storage media or electronically
stored information, the officer executing the warrant must make reasonable efforts to serve a
copy of the warrant on an owner or operator of the storage media.
Service may be
accomplished by any means, including electronic means, reasonably calculated to reach the
owner or operator of the storage media. Upon request of the government, the magistrate judge

may delay notice as provided in Rule 41(f(3).
Id.
33.

See id. at 172 (describing the problem of anonymization to further crime as "occurring with

greater frequency" and "increasingly common").
34.

See Sara Beale & Nancy King, Memorandum to Members of the Criminal Rules Advisory

Comm., in ADVISORY

MEETING

161

COMMITTEE ON

(2014),

availabk

at

CRIMINAL RULES, MATERIALS

FOR APRIL 7-8, 2014

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-

books/ advisory-committee-rules-criminal-procedure-april-2014

[https://perma.cc/7H64-PTV7]

(forwarding the amendment for publication and public comment in March 2014). The rule's
language following publication, public comment, and Supreme Court approval was automatically
adopted on December 1, 2016, due to inaction by Congress to oppose the change. See Erin Kelly,
Congress Allows Rulk PermittingMass Hacking by Government to Take Effect, USA TODAY (Nov. 30, 2016,
4:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/11/30/congress-allows-
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While DOJ lawyers pushed for a rule change, FBI agents received a tip
about a prolific child pornography website, Playpen, hosted on TOR.3 s
They received intelligence from "a foreign law enforcement agency" about
the website's true IP address;3 6 because the site was mistakenly available
on the regular Internet and not only on TOR (with a .onion address),
agents were able to identify the site's host as a server in Lenoir, North
Carolina.3 ' The FBI made a copy of the server. However, due to TOR's
relay system, visiting IP addresses were cloaked behind "exit node" IP
addresses.3
Investigators decided to seize and transport the server to an
FBI facility in Virginia to run a NIT while tracking visitor downloads.3
On February 20, 2015, Agent Douglas Macfarlane submitted an affidavit
to secure a NIT search warrant with Magistrate Judge Buchanan in the
Eastern District of Virginia.4 0 Judge Buchanan approved a search warrant
to deploy the NIT to search within the Eastern District of Virginia; 4 1 in
addition, Judge Buchannan also authorized a search on those computers
"of any user or administrator who logs into the TARGET WEBSITE by

rule-permitting-mass-hacking-government-take-effect/94683030/

[https://perma.cc/5EKU-P94K]

(explaining the automatic adoption of the proposed amendment to the rule due to lack of objection
by Congress). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b)(6) now reads:
[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities related to a crime may have
occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media
and to seize or copy electronically stored information located within or outside that district
if: . . . the district where the media or information is located has been concealed through
technological means; or . .
in an investigation of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), the
media are protected computers that have been damaged without authorization and are located
in five or more districts.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
35. See Joseph Cox, An Admin's Foolish Ermrs Helped the FBI Unmask Child Porn Site Tlapen',
MOTHERBOARD (May 16, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/an-admins-foolisherrors-helped-the-fbi-unmask-child-porn-site-playpen
[https://perma.cc/ZYB3-X7BG]
(citing to
court documents in which the FBI reveals "a foreign law enforcement agency" tipped them off to
Playpen's real IP address, which allowed the FBI to find the physical location of the hosting server).

3 6.

Id.

37.

See id.

("An

FBI Agent, acting in an

undercover capacity, accessed

IP address

192.198.81.106 on the regular internet and resolved to TARGET WEBSITE[.]").
38. See United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip
op. at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016)

("When

a user visits a website located on the Tor network . .

[the]

actual IP address is not shown . . . . [Hosts] can only see the IP address of the Tor 'exit node[.]').

39.

Id. at *2.

40.

Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant at 31, In the Matter of the Search

of Computers that Access upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015).
41.

Td.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss1/4
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entering a username and password."" The affidavit described Playpen as
a child pornography website hosted on TOR (a hidden service), with
special instructions on how to join and add images on the homepage of
"prepubescent females partially clothed and whose legs are spread[.]""
This information lead the affiant-and the magistrate-to conclude that
there was probable cause to believe anyone who logged into the site did so
with the knowledge and intention to possess or deal in child
pornography.4 4
The FBI installed the NIT and re-launched the website from their
facility in Virginia, running Playpen from February 20 to March 4 of
2015.4' Approximately 8,700 computers downloaded a NIT during the
Playpen takeover,4 including computers outside of the United States.
After collecting IP addresses on Playpen users, among other identifying
information,4
the FBI conducted physical searches of individual
residences for evidence of child pornography and filed charges against a
reported 350 defendants.4 9
This Comment will attempt to aggregate the legal challenges taken by
the multitude of defendants, many of whom have pooled their efforts into

42.
43.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 13.

44.

Id.

45.

United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1049 (C.D. Ill. 2016).

46.

See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 39, United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-

RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016) (detailing discovery received by the defense).
47.

See United States v. Carlson, No. 16-317

JRT/FLN),

2017 WL 1535995, slip op. at *3 (D.

Minn. Mar. 23, 2017) (noting the revelation that the NIT searched computers in 120 countries during

its deployment), adopted in part and rejected inpart, 2017 WL 3382309 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2017); Joseph
Cox, FBI Hacked Computers in Australia as Part of Global Child Porn Sting, MOTHERBOARD
2016,

8:47 AM),

(Oct. 10,

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/fbi-hacked-computers-in-australia-as-part-of-

global-child-porn-sting [https://perma.cc/XE7L-WAR5]

(finding evidence that multiple countries'

law enforcement agencies participated in Operation Pacifier, including Australia, Austria,

Chile,

Greece, and Turkey).
48.

Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant at 33, In the Matter of the Search

of Computers that Access upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89

(E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015)

(approving a collection of the computer's actual IP address, "a unique identifier generated by the
NIT," the type of operating system used on the computer, "information about whether the NIT has
already been delivered" to the computer, and the computer's Host Name, username, and media
access control (MAC) address).

49.

See

'Plapen' Creator Sentenced to 30 Years, FBI (May 5, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/

news/ stories/playpen-creator-sentenced-to-30-years

[https://perma.cc/4S5F-CRTP] (breaking down

the results of the Playpen investigation in which the FBI claims 350 United States Playpen-based
arrests and 548 international arrests).
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a "national working group,"5 0 in Part II. As of this writing, the United
States District Court opinions granting their respective defendants'
5 1
motions to suppress have been reversed under the good faith exception.
Multiple other defendants are on appeal from conviction. 5 2 Part III will
address the adoption of the Justice Department's desired language for
Rule 41(b) and evaluate the Playpen NIT search warrant affidavit from a
Fourth Amendment standpoint of probable cause and particularity.
II.

LEGAL CHALLENGES AGAINST THE PLAYPEN WARRANT
AND INVESTIGATION

The sheer number of defendants stemming from the Playpen takeover
has led to a growing web of contradictory opinions on a number of legal

50. Joseph Cox, Do!Zens of Lzn'yers Across the US Fight the FBI's Mass Hacking Campaign,
MOTHERBOARD (July 27, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/read/dozens-of-lawyersacross-the-us-fight-the-fbis-mass-hacking-campaign-playpen

51.

[https://perma.cc/DZ7H-TBS7].

See United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 318 (1st Cir. 2017) ("We disagree with the district

court that suppression is warranted, because the FBI acted in good faith reliance on the NIT
warrant."); United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313

(10th

Cir. 2017) (reversing the motion to

suppress granted by the district court due to the good-faith exception); United States v. Horton,
863 F.3d 1041, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 2017) (overturning two district court decisions granting motions to
suppress because the good-faith exception applies).

52.

See United States v. Chase, No.

5:15-CR-00015-RLV-DCK-1,

2016 WL 4639182

(W.D.N.C. Sept. 6, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 17-4675 (4th Cir. Nov. 11, 2017); United States v.
Hammond, No. 16-cr-00102-JD-1, 2016 WL 7157762 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016), appeal docketed, No.
17-10340 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2017); United States v. Kienast, No. 16-CR-103, 2016 WL 6683481 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 14, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 17-1840 (7th Cir. April 21, 2017); United States v. Darby,
190 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Va. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 17-4212 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2017); United
States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770 (N.D. W. Va. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 17-4125 (4th Cir.
Mar. 2, 2017); see also Notice of Appeal, United States v. Taylor, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (N.D. Ala.
2017) (No. 2:16-cr-00203-KOB-JEO-1); Notice of Appeal, United States v. Scanlon, No. 2:16-cr-73,
2017 WL 3974031 (D. Vermont Apr. 4, 2017); Notice of Appeal, United States v. Gaver, No. 3:16cr-88, 2017 WL 1134814 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2017); Notice of Appeal, United States v. Pawlak,
237 F. Supp. 3d 460 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (No. 3:16-CR-306-D(1)); Notice of Appeal, United States v.
Tran, 226 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D. Mass. 2016) (No. 16-10010-PBS); Notice of Appeal, United States v.
Owens, No. 16-CR-38-JPS, 2016 WL 7351270 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2016); Notice of Appeal, United
States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-RJB-1, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184174 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30,
2016); Notice of Appeal, United States v. McLamb, 220 F. Supp. 3d 663 (E.D. Va. 2016) (No. 2:16cr-00092-RBS-RJK); Notice of Appeal, United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016)
(No. 5:15-CR-50087-001); Notice of Appeal, United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016
WL 4821223 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016); Notice of Appeal, United States v. Henderson, No. 15-cr00565-WHO-1, 2016 WL 4549108 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016); Notice of Appeal, United States v.
Eure, No. 2:16cr43, 2016 WL 4059663 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016); Notice of Appeal, United States v.
Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (No. 15-434).
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challenges to the underlying search warrant5 3 that observers predict will
wind up in some form in front of the Supreme Court.54 The challenges
against the warrant can be split into two general categories: whether the
warrant violated Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and whether the search warrant affidavit afforded Magistrate
Judge Buchanan enough information to meet the probable cause and
particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Part II of this
Comment addresses Rule 41(b) and the remedies applied by courts,
normally employing the good faith exception to salvage evidence from the
exclusionary rule.
Part III analyzes probable cause and particularity
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, seemingly the only limits on
future searches and seizures of this type since Congress enacted the DOJ's
desired amendment, Rule 41(b)(6), on December 1, 2016.ss Reacting to
the fact the FBI facilitated the distribution of child pornography through
its two-week operation of the site, defendants have also brought motions
to dismiss for outrageous government conduct.5 6 Lastly, multiple courts
heard arguments over whether the FBI must reveal the computer code
behind their NIT in discovery, an order the Government has so far
refused.

53.

7

United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1048 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 2016) ("[R]easonable

jurists can-and have-come to different conclusions on these issues and . . . district judges will
await further guidance from the courts of appeals. The Court suggests readers familiarize themselves
with previous cases stemming from the warrant at issue in this case before continuing to read this

Order.").
54.
(Aug. 27,

See Mike Carter, FBIs Massive Porn Sting Puts Internet Privacy in Crossfire, SEATTLE TIMES
2016,

6:00

AM),

http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/fbis-massive-porn-

sting-puts-internet-privacy-in-crossfire/

[https://perma.cc/W43C-7QNH]

(quoting a senior staff

attorney of the Electronic Frontier Foundation); see also Stephen Montemayor, Minnesotans Caught in

FBI Child Porn Sting, Raising Constitutional Concerns, STAR TRIB.

(Oct. 9, 2016, 7:58 PM),

http://www.startribune.com/minnesotans-caught-in-fbi-child-porn-sting-raising-constitutionalconcerns/396472281/

[https://perma.cc/E9RL-U7J8]

("Many

legal observers expect the debate to

reach the Supreme Court one day.").
55.

See Kelly, supra note 34 (detailing Rule 41(b)(6)'s automatic enactment after a lack of action

by Congress to oppose the rule).
56.

See, e.g., Carter, supra note 52

("Michaud

and other defendants have also sought to have

their charges dismissed due to 'outrageous conduct' over the FBI decision to take [Playpen] over and
leave the site running.").
57.

See Order on Procedural History and Case Status in Advance of May 25, 2016 Hearing

at 1-2, United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash. May 18, 2016) (outlining the
"protracted discovery battle between the parties" in which the court ordered the full NIT code
turned over to the defense.

The Government appeared willing to comply; yet, ultimately, the

Government reversed course and refused disclosure).
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Whether the Network Investzgative Technique Constituteda Search

In order to violate Rule 41(b)'s jurisdictional requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant or the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the threshold question is whether the
hacking tool constitutes a search.5 8 To be a search under the Fourth
Amendment, the defendant must show the government acquired
information by invading a place or thing in which both he and society
affords a reasonable expectation of privacy.5 9
The conceptual split
between the courts depends on how they frame the threshold question:
either the defendant enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
computer (a place) or he lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP
address (a thing). 6 0 The underlying case law determining each question is
fairly clear-most courts hold that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their personal computers;6 however, most also
hold that the third-party doctrine forecloses any expectation of privacy in
an IP address. 6 2 So, while the courts agree the Fourth Amendment does
not protect an IP address when retrieved from a third party, the split
emerges over whether the third-party doctrine applies where the
government retrieves a computer's true IP address through infiltration into
the computer rather than pursuant to a subpoena of a third-party in

58.

See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 527-28 (E.D. Va. 2016) (addressing

whether the NIT deployment amounted to a search even though the government failed to raise the
argument).

59.

See United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, slip op. at *3

(W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (recognizing the standards for determining whether a search occurred

under the Fourth Amendment (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,

J.,

concurring))).

60.
at *4

Compare United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-cr-11-Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, slip op.

(M.D.

Fla. Aug. 10, 2016) (opposing the conflation of "the expectation of privacy associated

with an IP address with the expectation of privacy one has in the computer searched by the NIT"),

with United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip op. at *4-5
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (applying the third-party doctrine to exclude IP addresses from Fourth
Amendment protection, and emphasizing an IP address "is not a private physical

feature of a

computer, but a commonly disclosed digital one assigned by a third party").

61.

See United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (W.D. Ky. 2016) ("There appears

to be no dispute that [the defendant] Ammons enjoyed a subjective expectation of privacy in the
contents of his personal computer." (citing United States v. Conner, 521 F. App'x 493, 497 (6th Cir.

2013))).
62.

See id.

("It is

true that, as a general proposition, an individual does not possess a reasonable

expectation [of privacy] in his IP address." (citing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887

(6th Cir. 2016))).
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possession of the same records.6
The third-party doctrine was borne out of United States . Miller,6 4 in
which a defendant argued the subpoena of his bank records violated his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures of his
"private papers." 6 5 Specifically,
[R]espondent contends that the combination of the recordkeeping
requirements of the [Bank Secrecy] Act and the issuance of a subpoena to
obtain those records permits the Government to circumvent the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment by allowing it to obtain a
depositor's private records without complying with the legal requirements
that would be applicable had it proceeded against him directly.6 6
The Court announced "the general rule that the issuance of a subpoena to
a thirdparty to obtain the records of that party does not violate the rights of a
defendant[.]" 6
Miller argued the Fourth Amendment should protect his
bank records possessed by the bank like it does his personal papers within
his home.6 8 Yet the Court found Miller lacked a reasonable expectation
of privacy in documents he turned over to a third party.69
The bank
records (a thing) could not justify the application of Fourth Amendment
protections, but had the records been in his home (a constitutionally
protected place), the Fourth Amendment protections would be
enforced.7 o
United States . jean,"1 overturned by the Eighth Circuit on this point,7

63.

See United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *18-

19 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2016) ("The Court holds that the property seized was Arterbury's
computer. . . .

The Macfarlane affidavit makes it clear that the Government could not obtain

Arterbury's IP address until its malware made its way back to his computer in Oklahoma

and

directed it to provide information to the Government."), adopted by No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 67092 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2016).
64.

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

65.

Id. at 440-41.

66.

Id. at 441 (footnotes omitted).

67.

Id. at 444 (emphasis added).

68.

See id. at 441 (arguing the bank subpoenas subvert the Fourth Amendment).

69.

See id. at 443 (denying a person can maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in

documents turned over to a third party).

70.

See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) ("[W]hen it comes to the Fourth

Amendment, the home is first among equals.").

71.

United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016).
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draws similarities between IP addresses in the Playpen cases and telephone
numbers in Smith v. Maryland," another third-party doctrine case, in which
police officers requested a robbery suspect's "telephone company . .
installH a pen register at [their] central offices to record" all outgoing
phone numbers the suspect dialed.7 4 The Supreme Court ruled the pen
register did not amount to a search because Smith voluntarily turned
phone numbers over to the telephone company in order to place calls.7 5
However, where the Playpen cases differ-that the search and seizure
occurred within the defendants' individual computers rather than within
the records of a third party-the Court in Smith made sure to emphasize,
stating, "Since the pen register was installed on telephone company
property at the telephone company's central offices, petitioner obviously
cannot claim that his 'property' was invaded or that police intruded into a
'constitutionally protected area."'7 6

Multiple courts ruled the defendants in the Playpen cases do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP addresses, yet offer weak
justifications for the intrusion into individual computers to retrieve it.7 7

72.

United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (8th Cir. 2017) (pointing out Jean's

flawed analysis because the NIT operates by first searching a place in which society places a
reasonable expectation of privacy (citingJean,207 F. Supp. 3d at 933)).

73.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

74.

Id. at 737; see also Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 933 (deciding the first "hop" to the first TOR

node abrogates Jean's subjective reasonable expectation of privacy because his IP address is no
longer a "complete secret," and he ought to "assume some measure of risk that TOR's encryption
technology could be defeated").

75.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.

76.

Id. at 741.

Florida v. Jardines recently reinforced protections against physical intrusions of

constitutionally protected areas.

See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 ("[T]hough Katz may add to the

baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendments protections 'when the Government
does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area[.]" (quoting United States v.

Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
77. See United States v. Dzwonczyk, No. 4:15CR3134, 2016 WL 7428390, at *9 (D. Neb.
Oct. 5, 2016) (finding no search of the computer occurred because "Defendant's IP address is not a
'physical component of the computer," but is more akin "to a return address on an envelope"),

adopted by No. 4:15CR3134, 2016 WL 7428390 (D. Neb. Dec. 23, 2016).

The court first notes,

"absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement could not lawfully conduct a warrantless search of
Defendants home computer to obtain Defendants IP address."

Id. at *13.

The court, however,

inexplicably does not find malware which "compelled Defendants computer to produce its IP
address" to be a search.

See id. (recognizing there is no need for a search warrant to obtain "an IP

address because the IP address itself conveys no substantive information about the user or the
contents of the user's online communications"); United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-

00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip op. at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (declaring the defendant had
no expectation of privacy in his IP address because he disclosed it to third parties); United States v.
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United States v. Matish" explained "the Government's use of a technique
that causes a computer to regurgitate certain information, thereby
revealing additional information that the suspect already exposed to a third
party .

.

. does not represent a search" largely because society finds it

unreasonable to expect privacy in one's IP address." Taken to its logical
conclusion, these courts tacitly approve warrantless encroachment into
constitutionally protected spaces as long as law enforcement agents seize
only information a defendant at one time shared with a third party;8 0 this
proposition is clearly foreclosed by the proclamation in United States v.
JoneA1 that "KatZ did not erode the principle 'that, when the Government
does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in
order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of
the Fourth Amendment."' 8 2
Another court analogized the use of TOR as an anonymization tool to a
case in which a defendant used his neighbor's wireless signal without
permission to share child pornography." The defendant accessing the
wireless signal did not have an expectation of privacy society would deem
"'legitimate' given the unauthorized nature of his transmission."84
Similarly, the Playpen defendant's "use of T[OR] to view and share child
pornography is not only an activity that society rejects, but one that it

Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 617 (E.D. Va. 2016) (finding defendant "did not possess a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his computer"); United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 444-45
(E.D. Pa. 2016) ("He was aware that his IP address had been conveyed to a third party and he
accordingly lost any subjective expectation of privacy in that information.").

78.
79.
80.

United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2016).
Id. at 616-17.
See, e.g., United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1265 (D. Colo. 2016) ("For

example, if Mr. Workman had written his IP address [ down on a piece of paper and placed it on his
desk in his home, the government would not be permitted to conduct a warrantless search of his

home to obtain that IP address."), rev'd, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017).
81. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
82.

See id. at 407 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286

(1983)) (analyzing whether attaching a GPS device to an individual's vehicle amounts to a search).

83.

See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (agreeing that an

individual does "not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his wireless internet signal" (citing

United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 119-22 (3d Cir. 2014))).
84. See id. (quoting Stanley, 735 F.3d 114 at 120) (recognizing the Third Circuit's decision that
an expectation cannot be reasonable when the subjective expectation is not one society is willing to

recognize); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978) (comparing the defendant to a
"burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season [who] may have a thoroughly
justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as 'legitimate').
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seeks to sanction." 8 5 Although people take advantage of TOR worldwide
for perfectly legitimate purposes,8 6 when "establish[ed] . . . in such an
unauthorized manner[,]" the court views the service as one society is not
willing to accept. 8 7
The Eighth Circuit, along with a majority of district courts, believe the
search and seizure took place within a constitutionally protected area
because people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal
computers."" The FBI could not retrieve the IP address without the
NIT's invasion of the computer." As United States v. Darby9 o illustrates,
because FBI agents "plac[ed] code on Defendant's computer, the
government literally .

.

. invaded the contents of the computer."91

85.

Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 445.

86.

See

Inception,

TORPROJECT.ORG,

[https://perma.cc/Y3RM-5NPY]

https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en

(detailing use of TOR by journalists, law enforcement,

activists,

whistleblowers, business executives, militaries, and IT professionals).

87.

Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 445-46 (quoting Stanlej, 753 F.3d at 121).

88.

See United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1047 (8th Cir. 2017) ("Even if a defendant has

no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address, he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of his personal computer."); United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 366

(D.

Mass. 2016) (finding a NIT deployment searched the defendants personal computer, which

demanded a warrant); United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1051-55 (C.D. Ill. 2016) (agreeing
with other courts that a NIT requires a warrant); United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732,
738-39 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (concluding a NIT constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes
and therefore requires a warrant); Report and Recommendation at 11, United States v. Scarbrough,

No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS,

2016 WL

5900152

(E.D. Tenn. Aug. 26,

2016)

("Although

information sought, an IP address, may be information that individuals typically share
parties ...

the

with third

the location to be searched, the Defendants computer, is one to which Fourth Amendment

protections apply."

(citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492-93

(2014))), adopted by

Memorandum and Order, No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2016); United States v.
Adams, No. 6:16-cr-11-Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, slip op. at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016) ("The
NIT searches the user's computer to discover the IP address associated with that device. Therefore,
one's expectation of privacy in that device is the proper focus of the analysis . . . ."); United States

v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529-30 (E.D. Va. 2016) (recognizing the Fourth Amendment requires
a search warrant if the deployment of the NIT invades the constitutionally protected area of the
contents of the individual's computer); United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *18-19 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2016) (concluding the use of malware to obtain
and direct the IP address of the defendant back to the FBI constituted a search because the
information was not obtainable without seizing the defendants computer without his knowledge or

consent), adopted by No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67092 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2016).
89.

See United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1264 n.4 (D. Colo. 2016) (rebutting

the governments claim that the FBI inevitably could have found the IP address of the defendant;
Special Agent Macfarlane, afflant, concluded "the FBI could not obtain Playpen users' IP addresses

through other means"), rev'd, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017).
90.
91.

United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Va. 2016).
Td. at 530.
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The most extreme view, laid out in Matish but yet to be adopted by any
other court, claims a person cannot reasonably expect privacy in their
personal computer because, like the broken blinds a police officer peered
into in Minnesota r. Carter,9 2 "Government actors who take advantage of an
easily broken system to peer into a user's computer" are not searching in
Fourth Amendment terms.9 The broken system to which Judge Morgan
refers is the now drastically different world of computing from only nine
years prior, when the Ninth Circuit decided in United States r.
Heckenkamp, 4 that an individual retains a subjectively and objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in their network-connected computer.9 5
Today, however, as evidenced by multiple examples offered in the
opinion," "it appears to be a virtual certainty that computers accessing the
Internet can-and eventually will-be hacked." 97
The court also
emphasized the limited nature of the NIT's scope-only retrieving
identifying information-and ruled the NIT does not require a warrant
due to the unreasonableness of the expectation of privacy from computer
hacking.9
B.

Whether the Magistratein the Eastern Districtof Virginia Violated Rul 41(b)
by Issuing the Plajpen Search Warrant to Remotely Access Computers Outside of
the Districtand, If So, What Is the AppropriateRemedy
1. Under Which Subsection of Rule 41(b) Does the NIT Warrant
Fall?

Defendants largely challenged the Playpen search warrant on the
grounds that it violated Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 9 9 The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a), grants
92.

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).

Concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer wrote

that because a passerby can peer through someone's broken blinds, an officer doing the same should
not amount to a search. Id. at 104 (Breyer,J., concurring).

93.

United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 620 (E.D. Va. 2016).

94.

United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007).

95.

See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 617-18 (citing Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1146).

96.

See id. 619-20 (referring to the governments ability to unlock the Apple iPhone involved

in the San Bernardino terrorism case without Apple; the Ashley Madison hack; the Sony Picture
breach; multiple exposures of financial data; and the intrusion of a database full of sensitive federal
employee personnel records).

97.
98.

Id. at 619.
Id. at 620.

99.

See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 31 (D. Mass. 2016) (deciding what

remedy applies when law enforcement agents execute a search under a warrant issued in violation of
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United States magistrate judges all "powers and duties conferred or
imposed . . . by law or by the [Federal] Rules of Criminal Procedure[.]"100

Rule 41(b) provides magistrate judges power to issue search and seizure
warrants, but, unless the investigation falls under a particular exception,
restricts the warrant's reach to persons or property located within the
magistrate's district.1 '
Considering Playpen attracts tens of thousands of
visitors, 1 0 2 the NIT unsurprisingly searched computers well outside of the
Eastern District of Virginia.1 0o
The government, in several cases, attempted to differentiate the NIT
from a traditional search warrant by applying an exception within
Rule 41(b), 1 0 4 using both Rule 41(b)(2)-where the property resides
within the district at the time of a warrant's issuance, but moves outside of
the district before the warrant is executedos-and Rule 41(b)(4)-where
a tracking device is installed within the district.1 0 6 Several opinions grant
the NIT warrant an extraterritorial exception to Rule 41(b), finding it akin
to a tracking device, and saving the warrant from violating the rule.1 o 7
Rule 41(b)), rev'd, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017). The First Circuit overturned the district court opinion
in Levin based on the good faith exception without addressing the question of a Rule 41 violation or

prejudice standards. United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 2017).
100.
101.

28 U.S.C. § 636(a).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1).

102.

See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 34, United States v. Tippens, No. 16-cr-05110-

RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016) (describing discovery from the government which revealed over
100,000 Playpen visitors, approximately 8,700 IP addresses, and 214 resulting arrests throughout
Operation Pacifier).

103.

SeeJoseph Cox, Child Porn Sting Goes Globak FBI Hacked Computers in Denmark, Greece, Chile,

MOTHERBOARD

Jan.

22, 2016, 2:01

PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/read/child-porn-sting-

goes-global-fbi-hacked-computers-in-denmark-greece-chile

[https://perma.cc/FG88-45AD]

(cataloging multiple reports of the Playpen warrant's reach into foreign countries); see also Transcript

of Evidentiary Hearing at 39, United States v. Tippens, No. 16-cr-05110-RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1,
2016)

(revealing the government uncovered approximately 8,713 IP addresses during Operation

Pacifier, of which 7,281 connected back to locations outside of the United States).
104.

See, e.g., Lein, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 34 (rejecting the use of exceptions under Rule 41(b) as

applied to the NIT).
105.

See, e.g., United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 612 (E.D. Va. 2016) (arguing for

the use of exception under Rule 41(b)(2)).

106.

(D.

See, e.g., United States v. Laurita, No. 8:13CR107, 2016 WL 4179365, slip op. at *6

Neb. Aug. 5, 2016) (analogizing the NIT with a tracking device since the "computer in essence

travelled into the district of Nebraska to communicate with the website located in Nebraska" and
finding the warrant did not violate Rule 41(b)(4)).

107. See Opinion and Order at 15, United States v. Smith, No. 4:15-CR-00467 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 28, 2016) (finding the warrant justified under Rule 41(b)(4)); United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp.
3d 920, 941-42 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (deciding the warrant was valid according to Rule 41(b)(4)); United
States v. Eure, No. 2:16cr43, 2016 WL 4059663, slip op. at *9 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016) (recognizing
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Magistrate judges may issue tracking devices from within their districts that
then travel outside of their districts under Rule 41(b)(4).1 os Although the
search of the computer happens outside of the district, courts analogize
the NIT to a tracking device because they assume the defendants "digitally
touched down in the Eastern District of Virginia when they" visited
Playpen during the FBI's hosting.1 0 ' Another court cited to Kyllo v. United
States..o for the proposition that government agents in that case used
thermal imaging devices to search a home, which the Supreme Court
deemed presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."' Since the
government's intrusion with digital devices constituted a search, analogous
to the entering of the home in Kyllo, the defendant's entry into Playpen
amounted to a digital entry into Virginia. 1 12 The majority of cases,
including the Eighth Circuit's decision in Horton v. United States,"'
however, find the warrant falls under the category and territorial
requirements of Rule 41(b)(1) and violates the plain meaning of the
rule.1 1 4 These cases disagree with the concept that the NIT is similar to a
that there "were credible arguments that the current rule allowed this warrant"); Matish, 193 F. Supp.
3d at 612 (E.D. Va. 2016) (finding the magistrate had authority to issue the warrant despite its
potential to exceed the bounds of the magistrates jurisdiction); United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp.

3d 520, 536-37 (E.D. Va. 2016) ("Rule 41(b)(4) allows a magistrate judge to issue a warrant for a
tracking device to be installed in the magistrate's district.").

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4).
Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 536.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 612-13 (citing Kllo, 533 U.S. at 40).
Id. at 613.
United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017).

114. See Horton, 863 F.3d at 1047-48 (rejecting the government's argument of a "virtual" trip
resembling a tracking device because the NIT searched computers in Iowa); United States v.

Scarbrough, No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS, 2016 WL 5900152, slip op. at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11,
2016) (finding Rule 41(b)(1) as the applicable subsection for the NIT warrant and ruling the warrant
violated the jurisdictional requirements of said rule); accord United States v. Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d
236, 250-51 (D. Mass. 2016) (concluding that the warrant issued by the magistrate for the NIT

"technically violated Rule 41(b)"); United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1056 (C.D. Ill. 2016)

("Thus,

Rule 41(b)(1) did not authorize the magistrate to issue the warrant."); United States v.

Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1088 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (refusing any comparison between an NIT
and tracking device under an analysis under Rule 41(b)(1)), rev'd, United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d

1041 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 740-41 (W.D. Ky. 2016)
(rejecting the Government's interpretation of Rule 41(b)(1)); United States v. Knowles, 207 F. Supp.

3d 585, 599 (D.S.C. 2016) ("The NIT search warrant plainly was impermissible under Rule 41(b)(1)
and (2)."); United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, slip op. at *6
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016)

("[N]o provision

of Rule 41(b) gave the magistrate judge authority to issue

the NIT warrant, [therefore] the warrant technically violates Rule 41."); United States v. Workman,

205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1261 (D. Colo. 2016) (deciding the NIT warrant was not authorized under the

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

19

St. Mary's Law
Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 1, Art. 4
ST. MARY'S IAlJOURNAL

288

[Vol. 49:269

tracking device in the sense that it does not track, but rather searches and
As such, the warrant must be granted within the district in
seizes.1 1
which the magistrate sits, but "the 'activating computer' [may] never [be]
physically present within the [district], and .

'activating computer'
Rule 41(b)(4)." 1 1
2.

[is]

insufficient

.

. any digital presence of the

to convey

jurisdiction under

What Is the Remedy for a Rule 41(b) Violation?

The remedy for a Rule 41 violation varies throughout the circuits, but
courts generally follow one of two legal standards."' The standard
followed by the majority of circuits, described in United States v. Kmeger,"'

language of Rule 41(b)(1)), rev'd, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Henderson, No. 15cr-00565-WHO-1, 2016 WL 4549108, slip op. at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016) (declaring the NIT
warrant was not permissible under Rule 41(b) because the authorized search did not occur in the
jurisdiction of the magistrate that authorized the search); United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-cr-11-

Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, slip op. at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016) (refusing "to expand the
authority of the magistrate

judge beyond

the geographic

limitations

clearly established by

Rule 41(b)"); United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 441-42 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (conceding that
Rule 41(b) is applied flexibly, but refusing to extend the Rule to "powers . . . that are clearly not
contemplated and do not fit into any of the five subsections" of Rule 41(b) (citing United States v.

Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, slip op. at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016)));
United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 33-34 (D. Mass. 2016) (deciding the Governments
interpretation of Rule 41(b)(1) fails "because it adds words to the Rule" (citing Lopez-Soto v.

Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1999))), rev'd, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v.
Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *22 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25) ("[This
Court finds that the NIT warrant was not authorized by any of the applicable provisions of

Rule 41."), adopted by No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67092 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2016);
United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, slip op. at *5-6
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (applying Rule 41(b) flexibly still results in a holding that the NIT warrant
was invalid).

115.

See Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 249-50 (setting apart the Matish and Darby decisions,

though finding the tracking device argument plausible); Henderson, slip op. at *4

("The

NIT search

does not meet the requirements of 41(b)(4) because, even though it was analogous to a tracking
device in some ways, it nevertheless falls outside the meaning of a 'tracking device' as contemplated
by the rule.").
116.

Torres, slip op. at *5.

117.

Compare United

States

v.

Krueger,

809 F.3d

1109,

1113-14

(10th Cir.

2015)

(differentiating between a violation of constitutional import, which should result in suppression, and
a non-constitutional violation, which ought only be suppressed when the defendant can establish
prejudice or the intentional disregard of the rule), with United States v. Cazares-Olivas, 515 F.3d 726,
730 (7th Cir. 2008) (denying justification of "the exclusion of evidence that has been seized on the
basis of probable cause, and with advance judicial approval[,]" due to a violation of federal rules,
regardless of any prejudice or deliberateness showing (citing United States v. Trost, 152 F.3d 715, 722

(7th Cir. 1998))).
118. United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2015).
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first evaluates whether the violation created a breach of the individual's
Fourth Amendment rights."
If the rule violation causes a Fourth
Amendment violation, the defendant need not make a prejudice
showing-although exclusion might still be an inappropriate remedy. 1 2 0
If the rule violation does not reach constitutional magnitude, courts should
refuse suppression unless the defendant establishes the violation
prejudiced her or "there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard
of a provision in the Rule." 1 2 1 The alternative method, followed in the
Seventh Circuit, only suppresses evidence found to be lacking in probable
cause and without advance judicial approval. 1 2 2 The Fifth Circuit follows
yet another method, albeit similar to the Seventh, that evaluates the rule
violation under a good-faith-exception standard that will be further
discussed below. 1 2 3
119.

See United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 370 (D. Mass. 2016) (citing Krueger,

809 F.3d at 1113-14) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in that the warrant was sufficiently
particular and based on probable cause); Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1089 (following the reasoning of
Krueger that the court must first determine whether a "violation rises to the level of a Fourth

Amendment violation" (quoting Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1113-14)); Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 1263

("The

Tenth Circuit's opinion ...

Rule 41

violation

justifies

sets forth the analytical framework for determining whether a

suppression."

(citing Krueger,

809 F.3d

at 1113-14));

Report

and

Recommendation at 19, United States v. Scarbrough, No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS, 2016 WL
5900152 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2016) (analyzing whether the defendant suffered a Fourth
Amendment violation before moving to the prongs of prejudice or deliberate disregard for the law),

adopted by Memorandum and Order, No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS (ED. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2016); Adams,
slip op. at *7 (agreeing with precedent set in Krueger that in "absence of a constitutional violation"
Rule

41 demands exclusion

only in the presence of "prejudice"

or "deliberate

disregard of a

provision in the Rule" (quoting United States v. Loyd, 721 F.3d 331, 333 (11th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam))); United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip op.
at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (adopting a similar rule to other courts, that exclusion is only available
in the presence of a constitutional violation or if the defendant was either prejudiced or can show a

deliberate disregard of the rule (citing United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2005)));
United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 622 (E.D. Va. 2016) (assessing a Rule 41 violation
under the framework of Krueger similar to other circuit courts (citing United States v. Simons,

206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000))); Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 442-43 (citing Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d
at 34-35) (following a similar standard to Krueger, yet differentiating the definition of prejudice used

in the Third Circuit).
120.
121.
122.

Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1113-14.
Id. at 1114 (quoting United States v. Pennington, 635 F.2d 1387, 1390 (10th Cir. 1980)).
Ca!Zares-Olivas, 515 F.3d at 730 (citing United States v. Trust, 152 F.3d 715, 722 (7th Cir.

1998)).
123.

See United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, slip op. at *6-7

(W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (suppressing evidence only when police are shown to have "engaged in
willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct"
where

and, "[a]s

such, non-willful violations of Rule 41,

a search is executed pursuant to a warrant, properly supported by an affidavit showing

probable cause, and issued by a competent and neutral magistrate judge," suppression should not be
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The only courts to identify the Rule 41 violation as implicating the
Fourth Amendment held that a warrant issued by a magistrate without
jurisdiction renders the warrant void ab initio.12 4 United States v. Len 1 2 5
explains in depth why a violation of subsection Rule 41(b) should be set
apart as a substantive provision versus other procedural requirements of
Rule 41.126 The court states:
Because the violation here involved 'substantive judicial authority' rather
than simply 'the procedures for obtaining and issuing warrants,' the Court
cannot conclude that it was merely ministerial; in fact, because Rule 41(b)
did not grant her authority to issue the NIT warrant, the magistrate judge
was without jurisdiction to do so.... [B]ecause the magistrate judge lacked
authority, and thus jurisdiction, to issue the NIT Warrant, there simply was
no judicial approval. 1 2 7
The district court opinion in Levin has since been overruled, 1 2 8 with the
good faith exception nullifying any consideration of Rule 41 as a
substantive versus procedural rule. Defendants on appeal in other circuits
have attempted to overcome the good faith exception and argue that the
rule violation warrants suppression. 129 The district court in kemin cites

an available remedy (first quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); then citing United

States v. Comstock, 805 F.2d 1194, 1210 (5th Cir. 1986)).
124. See Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1090-91 (rejecting the government's argument that
defendant's computer was actually searched in the Eastern District of Virginia because his computer
accessed the FBI servers in that district, instead finding the search taking place outside of the

magistrate's authority, and void ab initio (citing Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 32-33)); Workman, 205 F.
Supp. 3d at 1263-64 (agreeing with the Arterbury court regarding warrants that are void ab initio);

United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *34 (N.D. Okla.
Apr. 25) (concurring with the reasoning of Krueger and Levin, leading to a decision that the warrant at

issue was void ab initio), adopted by No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67092 (N.D. Okla.
May 17, 2016); Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (holding "the warrant at issue here was void ab initio").
But see United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017) ("[IRhe warrant here
was not void ab initio, for the warrant could validly be executed by extracting data from computers
within the magistrate judge's district. . . .").

125.
2017).
126.

United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2016), rev'd, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir.
Id. at 35(quoting United States v. Berkos, 543 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2008)).

127.

Id. at 36 (citations omitted).

128.
129.

United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 2017).
Brief of the Appellant at 16, United States v. McLamb, No. 17-4299, 220 F. Supp. 3d 663

(E.D. Va. 2016) (attacking the search warrant under Rule 41 as void upon issuance and also on the
basis the rule violation prejudiced McLamb).
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Krweger because both cases addressed Rule 41(b),1 3 o and also happened to
involve
defendants accused of harboring child pornography. 3
Investigators in Krueger obtained and executed a warrant in the District of
Kansas on the defendant's residence; however, the only person at the
residence was Krueger's roommate, and Krueger had his cell phone and
computer with him.1 3 2
Krueger's roommate informed the Homeland
Security Investigations agents about Krueger's whereabouts at another
residence in Oklahoma City.1 3
An agent then requested and received
another warrant from a second magistrate judge in the District of Kansas
for a search to be carried out in Oklahoma. 1 3 4 The Krueger court stopped
short of addressing whether the warrant, issued outside of the magistrate's
jurisdiction under Rule 41(b)(1), violated Krueger's constitutional rights, or
merely infringed on procedural protections, because they found the
warrant prejudiced Krueger and required suppression.1 3 5
Other courts disagree with the district court in Levin-that Rule 41(b) is
substantive-for a number of reasons. For some, that a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP address causes the
constitutional issue to fall away.1 3 6 Another court found the warrant was
not void a/ ///o because "[e]ven if the magistrate judge in the Eastern
District of Virginia lacked the authority to issue a warrant that allowed the
FBI to deploy the NIT outside of that district, the magistrate judge did
have authority to issue a warrant in which the NIT deployed in that
district."1 3

130.

The Tenth Circuit also adopted this view.1 '

Therefore,

Lethn, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (citing United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109, 1115 n.7

(10th Cir. 2015)) (analyzing the violation of Rule 41(b) under the analytical framework of Kmueger).
131. Id. at 26; Kmeger, 809 F.3d at 1109.
132. Kmeger, 809 F.3d at 1111.
133.

Id.

134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. at 1115.
See United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip

op. at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016)

("[N]o

violation of 'constitutional magnitude' has occurred here

because Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address." (citing United States

v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016))); United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585,
615 (E.D. Va. 2016)

("Generally,

one has no reasonable expectation ofprivacy in an IP address when

using the Internet."); Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 443-44 (finding the defendant "had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his IP address").

137. United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 372 (D. Mass. 2016); see also United
States v. Adams, No. 6:16-cr-11-Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, slip op. at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10,
2016) (agreeing with other district courts that have concluded that a NIT is not similar to a tracking
device, and any issuance of such a warrant by a magistrate judge violates Rule 41(b)).
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"[t]he warrant was not void at its issuance."' In United States v. Lough,1 4 0
the court found the warrant provided everything required by the Fourth
Amendment-sufficient probable cause and particularity in the places to
be searched and things to be seized-thus surviving constitutional
scrutiny. 1 4 1 Similarly, United States v. Dz-vonqyk 1 42 lists three requirements
of the Fourth Amendment: "(1) a search warrant must be issued by a
neutral magistrate; (2) it must be based on a showing of probable cause,
and (3) it must satisfy the particularity requirement[;]" 1 4 3 and found the
warrant met each of these requirements. 14 4 The district court in Levin
took issue with the first requirement, finding the magistrate judge had no
authority to issue the warrant, which affected "the underlying validity of
the warrant." 1 4 5
Utilizing Fourth Amendment standards similar to Lough, the court in
jean also pointed out that "[a]nother indication that the violation was, if
anything, non-fundamental, is the fact that the search warrant could have
been authorized by an Article III judge [.]" 1 4 6 The Seventh Circuit
standard refuses suppression of the evidence unless the violation reaches a
constitutional harm, 1 4 7 pointing to United States v. Leon 1 48 as foreclosing

138. United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017) (citingAnlone,
208 F. Supp. at 372).
139. Anqalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 372.
140.

United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770 (N.D.W. Va. 2016).

141.

See id. at 779 (describing the lengthy FBI affidavit, which provided the magistrate enough

to believe evidence of a crime would be found and was limited in the places to be searched "only [to]
those users who affirmatively signed into the Playpen site using their screen name and password"); see

also United States v. Henderson, No. 15-cr-00565-WHO-1,

(N.D.

2016 WL 4549108,

slip op. at *4

Cal. Sept. 1, 2016) (finding the warrant to comply with the "requirements of probable cause

and particularity").

142.

United States v. Dzwonczyk, No. 4:15CR3134, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141297 (D. Neb.

Oct. 5), adoptedby No. 4:15CR3134, 2016 WL 7428390 (D. Neb. Dec. 23, 2016).
143. Id. at *21 (quoting United States v.
4212079, slip op. at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016)).
144.

Adams, No. 6:16-cr-11-Orl-40GJK,

2016 WL

See id. at *21-22 (concluding the warrant in this case met the requirements of probable

cause and particularity, however it did not decide neutrality because the issue was not raised by the
defendant).

The Dvonyk

court also agreed with the Eighth Circuit in Freeman, that violations of

the rule are only fundamental where the search was "unconstitutional

under traditional [F]ourth

[A]mendment standards." Id. (quoting United States v. Freeman, 897 F.2d 346, 346 (8th Cir. 1990)).
145.

United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2016) (citing United States v.

Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2013)), rev'd, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017).
146. United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 943 (W.D. Ark. 2016).
147. United States v. Hornick, 815 F.2d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting "it is difficult to
anticipate any violation of Rule 41, short of a defect that also offends the Warrant Clause of the
[F]ourth [A]mendment, that would call for suppression").
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exclusion based on technical defects in a warrant; 1 4 9 whereas those
circuits that follow the Kreger model continue to evaluate whether a
technical violation demands suppression. 5 0
Under the Kreger framework, if the court finds the violation nonconstitutional, or technical, the defendant must show either that he was
prejudiced or a provision of the rule was intentionally disregarded in order
to qualify for suppression of the evidence.' 5 ' The courts are also split on
how the defendant must establish prejudice, with some setting an
extremely high bar.1 5 2 Prejudice under K eger is defined "in the sense that
the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if
the Rule had been followed[.]"' 5 ' The prejudice standard in the Ninth
Circuit, however, sets a higher barrier-that a search would not have
occurred but for the violation.1 54
This distinction allows courts to
148.
149.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
See Hornick, 815 F.2d at 1158 (holding a Rule 41 violation is technical, not of Fourth

Amendment import, and not a conduit to evidence suppression (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21)).

150.

See United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 370 (D. Mass. 2016) (agreeing with

the analysis of Krueger that a Rule 41 violation requires a showing of prejudice or intentional disregard
if it does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp.
3d 1256, 1263

(D.

Colo. 2016) (referencing Pennington and Krueger as the "analytical

framework for

determining whether a Rule 41 violation justifies suppression"), rev'd, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 442 (E.D. Va. 2016) (analyzing violations of Rule 41
under the similar framework as Krueger, concluding "[t]here are two categories of Rule 41 violations:
those involving constitutional violations, and all others" (quoting United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d

392 (403 (4th Cir. 2000))); United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1089 (S.D. Iowa 2016)
(adopting the framework of Krueger in that "[o]nce a court determines that a Rule 41 violation has
occurred, it must next 'determin[e] whether that specific Rule 41 violation rises to the level of Fourth

Amendment violation'

(quoting United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109, 1113-14 (10th Cir.

2015))), rep'd, United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017).
151. See Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1113-14 (quoting United States v. Pennington, 635 F.2d 1387,
1390 (10th Cir. 1980)) (laying out when evidence is suppressible following a violation of a rule
governing the execution of a search warrant).

152.

See, e.g., Werdene, 188 F. Supp. at 446-47 (distinguishing between the Tenth Circuit's

prejudice standard and the Third's).

153.

Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1114.

154.

See United States v. Welch, 811 F.3d 275, 281 (8th Cir. 2016) (framing the prejudice

question as "whether the search would have occurred had the rule been followed" (quoting United

States v. Hyten, 5 F.3d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 1993))).
warrant violated Rule 41's notice requirement.

In this case, the defendant complained the

Id. at 279.

The court determined the investigators'

failure to notify the defendant of the search within thirty days did not prejudice Welch because "[t]he
nature of the investigation indicates they could have easily obtained extensions had they sought
them."

Id. at 281.

Therefore, investigators that followed the rule would have obtained the same

evidence against the defendant as investigators who did not.

Id.; see also United States v. Vasser,

648 F.2d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 1980) (asking whether the evidence gathered could have been obtained
through other lawful means).
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determine ways in which the IP address of the defendant could have been
discovered without the particular warrant used, such as explaining "the
FBI could have installed copies of Playpen in every judicial district in the
country (there are 94) and then secured a corresponding number of
Rule 41 warrants." 1 5 5 Another court opined that "[e]ven though difficult
for the Government to secure that information tying the IP address to [the
defendant], the IP address was public information, like an unlisted
telephone number, and eventually could have been discovered." 1 5 6
Several more courts point to the fact that a district court judge could have
issued the NIT warrant unrestricted by Rule 41, so the defendant cannot
show prejudice. 1 5' The District of Colorado, United States v. Workman, 15
found prejudice against the defendant because, had the Rule been
followed, the search would not have taken place, and pointing out to the
government that the court in Krueger asked whether the magistrate judge
could have issued the warrant under their own authority.1 5 9 When the
government argued the defendant could not be prejudiced due to an
unreasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address, the court rejected
"[t]he government's prejudice standard [because it] focuse[d] on whether
the evidence could have been obtained by other lawful means, while Knueger
ask[ed] whether this particular search would have occurred if the Rule had
been followed." 1 6 0 The Tenth Circuit overturned the district court in

155. United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip op.
at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016).
156. See United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, slip op. at *7
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (describing the Ninth Circuit standard as that found in Vasser, where
courts are directed to "consider whether the evidence obtained from a warrant that violates Rule
41(b) could have been available by other lawful means, and if so, [find] the defendant did not suffer
prejudice" (citing United States v. Vasser, 648 F.2d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 1980))).

157.

See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 944 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (agreeing with the

governments argument that the defendant must show "more than the fact that the defendant would
have been better off had the search not been conducted at all"); United States v. Lough,

221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 779-80 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (ruling no prejudice because a district court judge
could legally issue the same warrant (citing Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 944));

. United States v.

Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1263-64 (D. Colo. 2016) (disagreeing with the Governments
argument that prejudice does not exist where a district court judge could have issued the same
warrant because "the appropriate prejudice inquiry asks whether 'the issuing federal magistrate judge

could have complied with the Rule.' (quoting Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1116)), rev'd, 863 F.3d 1313
(10th Cir. 2017).
158. United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256 (D. Colo. 2016), rev'd, 863 F.3d 1313
(10th Cir. 2017).
159. Id. at 1263-64.
160.

Td. at 1264.
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Workman by assuming, without deciding, that the magistrate judge issued
the warrant outside of her authority-which either violated the
defendant's constitutional right or prejudiced him-yet finding the good
faith exception applies despite the rule violation.1 6
Finally, the Third Circuit takes an entirely different approach to
prejudice by suppressing evidence when the search "offends concepts of
fundamental fairness or due process." 1 62 The court in United States v.
Werdene" explained how investigators could not have found the
defendant in any other manner, that they sought out and received the
warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate, and that they described in
copious detail how the NIT would deploy within their standards of
fundamental fairness and due process.1 6 4
C.

The Good FaithException

Although a Rule 41 violation may call for suppression of illegally seized
evidence, almost all courts ruling on the Playpen warrant, including the
First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, found the good faith exception of Leon
and Herring v. United States"'s prevented exclusion.1 '
Even the courts
finding the warrant void ab initio split on whether to suppress under the
good faith exception."7 L0n announced the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, whereby courts should not remedy Fourth Amendment
violations through suppression of evidence resulting from an illegal search
161.
162.

United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (10th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 1974).

163.

United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 2016).

164.
165.
166.

Id. at 447.
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
See United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 324 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Horton,
863 F.3d at 1052-53 (8th Cir. 2017) (applying the Leon exception because any deterrence value of
exclusion fails to outweigh the costs); Workman, 863 F.3d at 1319 n.3 (distinguishing Krueger by
pointing out the government waived the good-faith exception in that case); see also United States v.
Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d 236, 252 (D. Mass. 2016) (setting apart Kmeger-in which the court found the
good faith exception did not apply where the warrant was void ab initio-as an instance in which the
officials acted with gross negligence, rather than a more ambiguous question of law with the Playpen
NIT).
167. Compare United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 40-41 (D. Mass. May 5, 2016) (siding
with courts deciding that the good-faith exception does not apply to warrants which are void ab initio
(citing United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2001), overruled by United States v. Master,
614 F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 2010))), rep'd, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017), with United States v. Scarbrough,
No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS, 2016 WL 5900152, slip op. at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2016) (refusing
to reexamine Masters and follow Scott, as argued by the defendant, because "[t]his court does not
'reexamine' Sixth Circuit precedent. Instead, this court follows it").
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or seizure, if the police officers involved acted in objectively reasonable
reliance on a later invalidated search warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate. 1 6 8
One court defines objectively reasonable reliance as
"whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal in light of that constellation of circumstances." 1 6 9 After
Hering's interpretation of Leon, the good-faith exception appears nearly
impenetrable for defendants attempting to suppress evidence in the face of
an invalidated search warrant. 17 0 The Herring interpretation requires a
balancing test that analyzes whether "police [mis]conduct [is] sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it and sufficiently culpable
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system." 7
Of those courts that found the NIT prejudiced the defendant, none felt
suppression appropriate after accounting for deterrence and the culpability
of the police officers. 17 2 Only courts that found the warrant void ab initio
resorted to suppression,1 7 3 and of those, the district court decisions in

168. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-24 (1984) (announcing the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, which turned the focus of the Fourth Amendment from the
occurrence of a violation, to judicially enforced deterrence of reckless or intentional misbehavior by
police officers).

169. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 451 (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171
(3d Cir. 2014)).
170. See United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109, 1125 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring)

("Even

when an unreasonable search does exist, the Supreme Court has explained, we

must be persuaded that 'appreciable deterrence' of police misconduct can be had before choosing
suppression as the right remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation." (quoting Herring, 555 U.S.

at 141)).
171.

Master, 614 F.3d at 243 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).

172. See Scarbrough, slip op. at *1 (deciding although "the Virginia warrant violates both the
Fourth Amendment and Rule 41[,]" Herringdemands a focus on deterrence of police mistakes, and,
here, the magistrate ultimately made the error in judgment); United States v. Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d
236, 252 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding the NIT amounted to a technical violation, but the good-faith
exception applies because FBI agents reasonably relied on the warrant); United States v. Ammons,

207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 744-45 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (applying the good-faith exception even when the
warrant is void ab initio (citing Master, 614 F.3d at 241-43)); United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-cr-11-

Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079,

slip op. at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016) (agreeing with the

Government's contention that "suppression is a 'last resort,' not the 'first impulse'

(citing Herring,

555 U.S. at 140-41)).
173. See United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1090-91 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (denying
the good faith exception to save the Playpen warrant because it was void ab initio), rev'd, United States

v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1267

(D.

Colo. 2016)

("[W]here

the warrant is void ab initio under Rule 41(b) the good-faith exception

does not apply." (citing United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67091, at *34 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25), adopted by No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist LEXIS 67092
(N.D. Okla. May 17, 2016))), rev'd, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017); Arterbury, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Croghan, Workman, and kevin have been overturned by the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits. 1 7 4

All decisions finding the warrant void ab initio wrangled with Sixth
Circuit precedent, the only circuit to have addressed the issue of
suppression when a warrant is void at its issuance.1 7 5
United States v.
Scott,1 7 ' decided in the Sixth Circuit in 2001, refused to apply the goodfaith exception to a warrant issued by a judge without authority, because
the court did not feel that Leon "contemplate[d] a situation where a
warrant is issued by a person lacking the requisite legal authority." 1 7 7
Nine years later, with Herring decided in the interim, the Sixth Circuit
reviewed another case where the warrant was issued without appropriate
judicial authority; 178 this time the Sixth Circuit found the per se rule
announced in Scott out of step with Supreme Court precedent.1 7 9 Void
warrants, versus subsequently invalidated warrants, no longer require
suppression under Master,1 so rather, courts should apply the Hering
balancing test to determine whether exclusion is appropriate on a case-bycase basis.1 "' While some courts follow Master and apply a balancing test
focused on police deterrence, others believe Scott to be the better
decision. 18 2 The district court in Ledin applies the exclusionary rule
67091, at *35 (declaring the good-faith exception inapplicable to a warrant that is void ab initio (citing

United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 42 (D. Mass. 2016),tre'd, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017)));
Lethn, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 42 (holding it was not objectively reasonable for the police officers to rely
on the warrant issued by a magistrate judge without jurisdiction to issue the warrant (citing United

States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2013))).
174. See United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1052-53 (8th Cir. 2017) (reversing the district
courts grant of suppression for the defendants in Croghan and Horton); United States v. Workman,

863 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2017) (overturning the district courts decision because the good-faith
exception applies).

175.

See, e.g., Lethn, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 39-40 (citing Master, 614 F.3d at 236) ("This court is

aware of only one federal circuit court to address the question of whether Leon's good-faith exception
applies in these circumstances: the Sixth Circuit.").

176.
177.

United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 515.

178.

Master, 614 F.3d at 241.

179.
180.

Id. at 242.
See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 783 (N.D.W. Va. 2016) ("[Wlhether the

warrant is void ab initio or voided at a later date is immaterial to the question presented.").
181.

See id. at 783

(looking to Leids analysis of Scott and Master, but ultimately deciding

Masters reasoning fits more in line with Supreme Court doctrine); Master, 614 F.3d at 243

("The

Supreme Court has effectively created a balancing test by requiring that in order for a court to
suppress evidence

following the finding of a Fourth

Amendment violations, 'the benefits

of

deterrence must outweigh the costs."' (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009))).

182.

Compare United States v. Scarbrough, No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS, 2016 WL 5900152,
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because the void NIT warrant authorized nothing, the NIT performed a
warrantless search, and the good-faith exception does not apply to
warrantless searches.1 ' However, the First Circuit since overturned that
decision, looking to Leon and ruling out any application of the Leon
exceptions. 18 4
The Tenth Circuit overturned the district court in
Wl'orkman, which had adopted Ledn's conclusion, because the Supreme
Court precedent in Herringand Arizona v. Evans,1 ss applied the good-faith
exception even when the agents relied "on warrants that had been recalled
or quashed."1 8 6 The mistake here was made by a magistrate judge, so
"there was nothing to deter." 1 8" 7
In a majority of Playpen cases, courts did not find sufficiently deliberate
conduct on the part of the FBI agents in obtaining the warrant for the
exclusionary rule to perform its deterrence function.1 '
The level of
deliberateness should be gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional
conduct rather than mere, isolated events of negligence.1 " 9 The balancing
act of the good-faith exception also pits the culpability of police behavior
against "letting a 'guilty and possibly dangerous defendant[ ] go free"' by
suppressing what may be the government's entire case.1 9 0 Leon outlined

slip op. at *1-2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2016) (following Master despite arguments by the defendant to

the contrary), with United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 41 (D. Mass. 2016) (believing an
expansion to the good faith exception

"improvident" because

"courts would

have to tolerate

evidence obtained when an officer submitted something that reasonably looked like a valid warrant
application, to someone who, to the officer, appeared to have authority to approve that warrant

application"), rev'd, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017).
183.

See Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (concluding the good-faith exception did not apply to the

warrantless search because it was unreasonable for agents to rely on a warrant void ab initio).

184.
185.

United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 322 (1st Cir. 2017).
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).

186.

See United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1319(10th Cir. 2017) ("How can we say

that an agent is unable to rely on a warrant exceeding a magistrate judge's reach if the agent is able to
rely on a warrant that doesn't even exist?").

187.

Id. at 1318-19.

188.

See, e.g., United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1058 (C.D. Ill. 2016) (lauding the

FBI agents involved in obtaining the NIT warrant as "unusually detailed and specific" in their
statements to the magistrate rather than condemning their actions).

189.

See United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 742-43, 745 (W.D. Ky. 2016)

(quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011)) (ruling negligence cannot justify societal
costs borne by suppression).

190.
555 U.S.

See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Herring,
at 141) (balancing these costs against the "deterrent effect on law enforcement,"

and

coming to the conclusion that suppressing the evidence "would only serve to 'exact[] a heavy toll on
both the judicial system and society at large'

(quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 237)).
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four scenarios in which the balance favors suppression,1 9 1 and which the
Playpen defendants argued applied to the NIT warrant. 1 9 2
Multiple defendants contend law enforcement agents could not
reasonably rely on the NIT warrant because it suffered from the glaring
facial deficiency of a Rule 41(b) violation. 1 93
Should nineteen-year
veterans of the FBI know Rule 41(b) limited (prior to December 1,
2016)194 the magistrate judge's authority to issue a warrant outside the
district in which she sits? 1 95 Though some courts believe experienced
FBI agents ought to know the limits of Rule 41(b),' 9 6 most point to the
varied decisions stemming from the Playpen cases as proof Rule 41(b) is
subject to reasonable alternative interpretations.1 9'

191.

(M.D.

First, they say, courts

See United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-cr-11-Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, slip op. at *7

Fla. Aug. 10, 2016) (denying the good faith exception in four circumstances: "(1) when 'the

magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant
knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth,'
(2) when 'the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role,' (3) when the affidavit supporting
the application for a warrant is 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable,' and (4) when 'a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e., in failing
to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-that the executing officers cannot

reasonably presume it to be valid' (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984))).
192.

See id.

("Defendant's

argument appears to focus on the fourth category identified by the

Supreme Court in Leon: facial deficiencies in the search warrant."); see also Opinion and Order at 10-

11, United States v. Smith, No. 4:15-CR-00467 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2016) (rejecting defendant's claim
that FBI agents acted unreasonably because

the agents could not possibly believe

all "214,898

members of [Playpen]" resided within Virginia).
193.
or

See Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 743-44 (declining to categorically suppress a void warrant

deny FBI agents

the good

faith

exception

when multiple courts

questioned

Rule 41(b)'s

application); see also United States v. Dzwonczyk, No. 4:15CR3134, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141297,
at *26

(D. Neb.

Oct. 5) (applying Eighth Circuit precedent, holding even a facially obvious error does

not foreclose the good faith exception (citing United States v. Hessman, 368 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th

Cir. 2004))), adopted by No. 4:15CR3134, 2016 WL 7428390 (D. Neb. Dec. 23, 2016).
194.

See Kelly, supra note 34 (describing opponents' failed efforts to delay enactment of the

amended Rule 41(b)(6) on December 1, 2016).
195. See United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 42 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding it not
objectively reasonable for a nineteen-year veteran of federal law enforcement to be ignorant of the

NIT's impropriety), rev'd, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017).
196.
the agents

See United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1093 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (determining
here sufficiently knowledgeable

to doubt the NIT warrant's

legality outside

of the

magistrate's district), rev'd, United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017).
197.

See United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1051-52 (8th Cir. 2017) (determining the

warrant not facially deficient because multiple district courts ruled it to be facially valid); United

States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2017) (declining to hold law enforcement officers
accountable for nuanced legal questions); Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 745 (deciding the different
interpretations by several courts, that the warrant was a tracking device under Rule 41(b)(4), was
strong evidence the FBI did not act deliberately in violation of the rule by seeking the warrant);
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should not punish law enforcement officers for not knowing the law when
the magistrate made the decision to issue the warrant." The FBI agents
sought counsel from DOJ Attorneys, a factor one court explicitly included
in the "good faith calculus" to the benefit of the government.19 9
Magistrate Judge Franklin Noel, however, in his Report and
Recommendation in United States v. Carlson,2 0 0 refused to allow the
magistrate's judgment to absolve the FBI agents, stating, "the good-faith
exception . .
does not stand for the improvident proposition that great
deference should be extended to a magistrate judge deliberately or
recklessly exercising authority inimical to the source of her statutory power
to issue a warrant." 2 0 1 Judge Noel also noted the agents' use of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705 to extend notice and the request of the use of NIT malware under
Rule 41 belies any ignorance of proper procedures.2 0 2 Judge Noels'
recommendation, to the extent it granted the defendant's motion to
203
suppress, was not adopted by the district court.
The claim that the Rule 41(b)(6) amendment, instigated by the DOJ,
shows knowledge on the part of the DOJ and FBI of jurisdictional limits
of the rule can be argued both ways. 2 0 4 In DZwoncZyk, the addition of

Report

and Recommendation

at 22, United

States v.

Scarbrough,

No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS,

2016 WL 5900152 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 26) (pointing to one-third of the cases related to the Playpen
hack concluding the NIT warrant did not violate Rule 41(b)), adopted by Memorandum and Order,

No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2016).
But see Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 745 (distinguishing cases in which law enforcement

198.

agents deliberately or recklessly induce the magistrate's mistake).

199.

See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 2014) ("We have previously

considered reliance on government attorneys in our good faith calculus and concluded that, based
upon it in combination with other factors, '[a]

reasonable officer would . . . have confidence in [a

search's] validity."' (quoting United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 153 (3d Cir. 2010))); see also United
States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 452 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (explaining reliance on DOJ attorneys
provided FBI agents greater confidence in the legality of their actions).

200. United States v. Carlson, No. 16-317 JRT/FLN), 2017 WL 1535995 (D. Minn. Mar. 23,
2017), adoptedin partand rejectedinpart,2017 WL 3382309 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2017).
201. Id.at*10.
202.

Id. at *9.

203.

See id. at *1 (relying on the Horton decision from the Eighth Circuit, decided on July 24,

2017, which found the good faith exception saved the warrant) (citing United States v. Horton,

863 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017)).
204.

See, e.g., United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436,

slip op. at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016)

("Defendant

FBI knew it was operating outside Rule 41.

takes this proposed amendment to mean that the

But the amendment actually cuts the other way.

It

would be strange indeed for the Court to suppress . . . in the face of a strong signal from the
Supreme

Court that Rule 41 should explicitly permit the issuance of warrants

like the NIT

Warrant.").
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Rule 41(b)(6) indicates to the court that Rule 41(b) did not provide
authority to Magistrate Judge Buchanan to authorize the Playpen NIT
warrant. 2 0 5 However, in United States v. Knowles, 2 0 6 the court found it
unnecessary to assume the rule change meant evidence found prior to its
enactment need be "suppressed as deliberate disregard of the former rule,"
especially considering the exclusionary rule's purpose is future
deterrence.2 0 7 In Lein, the First Circuit praised the agents for turning a
legal question over to the magistrate for determination, with the caveat
that this case is different from one "in which the government would
request and somehow obtain a warrant for conduct it knows to be
illegal." 2 0 8 Other courts refused to fault the FBI agents for the failures of
the rule itself, stating, "the instant NIT warrant has brought to light the
need for Congressional clarification regarding a magistrate's authority to
issue a warrant in the internet age[.]" 2 0 9 Second, the exclusionary rule, at
least since Leon, "operates as a 'judicially created remedy' to deter police
through the suppression of evidence. 2 1 0 Leon explains the reasoning
behind courts excusing Fourth Amendment violations caused by mistakes
of judges and magistrates. 2 1 1 First, the Supreme Court intended the
exclusionary rule to apply to police misconduct rather than judicial
errors. 2 1 2 "Second, there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and
magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or
the lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme

205.

See United States v. Dzwonczyk, No. 4:15CR3134, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141297,

at *7-8

(D.

flexibly,

as

Neb. Oct. 5) (looking to the plain meaning of the rule rather than applying the rule

desired

by

the

government),

adopted by

No. 4:15CR3134,

2016 WL

7428390

(D. Neb. Dec. 23, 2016).
206. United States v. Knowles, 207 F. Supp. 3d 585 (D.S.C. 2016).
207. Id. at 606; see also United States v. Tran, No. 16-10010-PBS, 2016 WL 7468005, at *5-6

(D.

Mass. Dec. 28, 2016) (regarding testimony by FBI Special Agent Daniel Alfin, that executives at

the highest levels of the FBI and DOJ reviewed the Playpen NIT warrant before its submission, as
evidence of good faith).

208.

United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 323 n.6 (1st Cir. 2017).

209.

United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE,

2016 WL 4821223, slip op. at *7

(W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016); accord United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 538 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(applauding the FBI for their actions in the face of the rules inability to keep up with technology).

210.

See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984) (quoting United States v.

Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)) (introducing the balancing test "resolved by weighing the costs
and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible
evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that
ultimately is found to be defective").

211.

Id. at 916-17.

212.

Td. at 916.
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sanction of exclusion."213

Lastly, the Supreme Court in Leon disbelieved
suppression imposed a significant deterrent effect on judges or
magistrates, and the same effect could be had, without the costs of
suppression,
by
an
appellate
court later
ruling the warrant
2 14
unconstitutional.
Many defendants attempted to get around the barrier of the good-faith
exception by claiming the government purposefully misrepresented the
NIT's capabilities to the magistrate judge-obscuring the fact the FBI
intended the NIT to travel outside the magistrate's district2 15 -and
by
claiming the FBI agents mischaracterized the home page of Playpen at the
time the search warrant affidavit was submitted, requesting a Franks
hearing to introduce outside facts. 2 1 6
In regard to the first claim, the application for the search warrant reads,
"I have reason to believe that on the following . .. property located in the
Eastern District of Virginia there is now concealed" evidence of child
pornography offenses. 2 1 7 In another section, the affidavit states, "it is
respectfully requested that this Court issue a search warrant authorizing . .
the NIT [to] cause an activating computer-wherever located-to send to a
computer controlled by or known to the government, network level
messages containing information that may assist in identifying the
computer .... ."218 The only direct admission within the affidavit that the

213.

See id. at 916 n.14 (noting the Court did not find rubber stamp judges to be "a problem of

major proportions").

214.

Id. at 916 n.15 (1984).

215.

See United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1058 (C.D. Ill. 2016) (arguing "the FBI

having two different judges issue warrants is evidence of deliberateness and culpability," which the
court

dismisses

as

"rank

speculation");

United

States v.

Adams,

No. 6:16-cr-11-Orl-40GJK,

2016 WL 4212079, slip op. at *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016) (disagreeing with defendants contention
that no FBI agent with nearly two decades of experience could reasonably rely on the NIT warrant
due to Rule 41(b)'s obvious restrictions).

216. See United States v. Eure, No. 2:16cr43, 2016 WL 4059663, slip op. at *6
(E.D. Va. July 28, 2016) (denying defendants request for a Franks hearing to show the FBI falsely
presented information about the homepage of Playpen-described in the search warrant as an image
of two prepubescent girls "in their underwear with their legs spread" apart-versus the homepage's
appearance at the time the agents submitted the NIT search warrant affidavit-"a single image beside
the site logo of a slightly older child whose legs were crossed and who was wearing stockings and a

short dress or top"); see also United States v. Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d 236, 246 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding
a Franks hearing was not required under these circumstances).
217.

Application for a Search Warrant, In the Matter of the Search of Computers that Access

upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015) (emphasis added).
218.

Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant at 29, In the Matter of the Search

of Computers that Access upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89

(E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015)
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NIT operates by searching and seizing outside of the magistrate's district is
the term "wherever located," though later the warrant requests
authorization to target the computer "of any user or administrator who
logs into the TARGET WEBSITE." 2 1 9 The disagreement boils down to
whether FBI agents presented Magistrate Judge Buchanan enough
information to make a decision about authorizing an extraterritorial search
warrant.2 2 0 The government argued in one hearing, "[t]he notion that
Magistrate Judge Buchanan could have read that . . [thirty]-page affidavit,
and that search warrant[,] and not understood exactly what the
government intended to do is preposterous." 2 2 1 The defense countered
that 7,281 of approximately 8,713 IP addresses discovered through
Operation Pacifier-close to 84 percent-originated in foreign countries,
yet the warrant affidavit explicitly divulged that the location of the
computers may not be within the magistrate's district only once. 2 2 2 So
far, no district court judges have ruled that the FBI agents acted recklessly
or intentionally to mislead Magistrate Judge Buchanan; instead, several
believed "FBI agents were, at every juncture, up front with the magistrate
judge about how the NIT worked, what it would seize from 'activating
computers,' and where 'activating computers' could be located." 2 2 3
Magistrate Judge Noel, however, believed agents "recklessly disregarded
proper procedure" in requesting the NIT warrant because of the "obvious
conflict between the issued warrant, which on its face, was limited to
searches in the Eastern District of Virginia, and Agent Macfarlane's
affidavit, which sought to search activating computers, wherever on the
planet that they were located[,]" specifically faulting Agent Macfarlane for
placing the "wherever located" explanation in paragraph forty-six rather
(emphasis added).
219. Id. at 32.
220.

Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 29, United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-

RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016) ("[The government] say[s] that [judge Buchanan] knowingly
signed an unprecedented global warrant for 120 countries . . . that the Department of Justice in its
own material says you can't issue.

221.

Id. at 45.

222. Id. at 39 (producing memos in which the FBI describes Operation Pacifier as an
"international investigation").

223. United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip op.
at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016); see also United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1058 (C.D. Ill.
2016) ("[TRhe Court finds no indication in this record of any false or misleading statements made to
the magistrate in the warrant application that could support an inference of bad faith. On the
contrary, the governments efforts in establishing probable cause and obtaining the NIT warrant
were unusually detailed and specific.").
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than the cover sheet of the warrant application.2 2 4
The second claim, involving misrepresentations to a magistrate, involves
the appearance of the homepage of Playpen.2 2 5 At some point between
authoring the search warrant affidavit and its submission, the homepage
changed in appearance from two "prepubescent females partially clothed
and whose legs are spread"2 2 6 to "a single prepubescent female wearing
fishnet stockings and posed in a sexually suggestive manner." 2 2 7 In order
to introduce information outside of the four corners of the affidavit, the
defense must seek a hearing via Franks v. Delaware,2 2 first showing the
affiant intentionally or recklessly included a false statement in the affidavit,
and then that the "statement is necessary to the finding of probable
cause." 2 2 9 Courts ruled the original homepage image unnecessary for the
determination of probable cause due to the amount of other evidence and
the suggestive nature of the second image. 2 3 0
The defense in jean argued the FBI's failure "to encrypt the connection
between [the defendant's] computer and the FBI server during the
deployment of the malware" potentially jeopardized the data's reliability-

224.

(D.

United States v. Carlson, No. 16-317

JRT/FLN),

2017 WL 1535995, slip op. at *9

Minn. Mar. 23, 2017) (faulting Agent Macfarlane for placing the "wherever located" explanation

in paragraph forty-six rather than the cover sheet of the warrant application), adoptedin partand rejected

in part, 2017 WL 3382309 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2017).

Magistrate Judge Noel also explained his

disagreement with other courts' interpretations of the warrant because the additional information on
Affidavit A-with a general description of the place to be searched as any activating computerdirectly contradicts the geographical limitation on the face of the warrant to the Eastern District of
Virginia.

See id. at *14

("[The

Court is aware of no legal authority which stands for the proposition

that an affidavit, whether incorporated or not, can expand the scope of a warrant beyond its express
limitations; especially an affidavit in direct contradiction to the issued warrant.").

225.

See United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 606 (E.D. Va. 2016) (finding the

defense failed to meet their burden for a Franks hearing).
226.

Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant at 29, In the Matter of the Search

of Computers that Access upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015).
227. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 595, 606.
228.

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

229.
230.

Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 606 (quoting Franks,438 U.S. at 155-56).
See United States v. Tran, No. 16-10010-PBS, 2016 WL 7468005, at *7 (D. Mass. Dec. 28,

2016) (finding that had Agent Alfin seen the new homepage, but failed to communicate the change
such that the affidavit could be updated, his behavior would be reckless; however, since the false
statement in the affidavit was not necessary to a finding of probable cause, the court need not

address Agent Alfin's actions); United States v. McLamb, 220 F. Supp. 3d 663, 670 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(citation omitted)

("The

Defendant's statement that the description of the logo on the homepage

'was a pivotal component of the affiant's allegations in support of probable cause,' . . . offends
common sense . . . .").
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to the point FBI agents acted objectively unreasonably to so rely.2 3 1
The court disagreed with the defendant's contention, applying the
good-faith exception.2 3 2
The situations outlined in Leon, such as facial deficiency of the warrant
and misrepresentations to the magistrate, operate within the larger sphere
of the rule outlined in Herring that in order for the exclusionary rule to
apply, the defendant must show "police conduct .

.

. sufficiently deliberate

that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system." 2 3 3
The courts that found the balance in favor of suppression believed
"[e]xclusion of the evidence in this case will serve the remedial and
prophylactic purposes of the exclusionary rule" to deter violations of
Rule 41(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, "the purpose [of which] is
to carry out the mandate of the Fourth Amendment. "234
Those that weighed against suppression felt the FBI agents acted
reasonably rather than culpably. 2 35 FBI agents generally "did the right
thing" by gathering evidence, putting together a detailed affidavit,
choosing the federal district most closely related to the target website, and
limiting the information seized. 2 3 6

As detailed above, most courts found

the agents made, at most, negligent mistakes, not sufficiently deliberate for
deterrence to "pay its way." 2 3 7 On the other side of the balance are
"Defendant's general and conclusive argument[s] regarding the need to
Or the proposal that
protect the privacy rights of all citizens . .. "2
"[the defendant] and other viewers and distributors of child pornography
can escape capture and continue their viewing and distribution so long as
they use Tor, while society and the children victimized by their behavior

231.

United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 938 (W.D. Ark. 2016).

232.

See id. at 937 (noting reliability of data goes to the weight of the evidence at trial rather

than admissibility).
233. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
234.

United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *35

(N.D. Okla. Apr. 25),
adopted by
No. 15-CR-182-JHP,
2016 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
67092
(N.D. Okla. May 17, 2016).
235. See United States v. Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d 236, 251-52 (D. Mass. 2016) (approving the
FBI's attempts to comply with rules unable to keep up with technology).

236. United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 538 (E.D. Va. 2016).
237. United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 743 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (quoting Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011)).
238.

United States v. Scarbrough, No. 3:16-cr-00035-RLJ-CCS, 2016 WL 5900152, slip op. at

*2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2016).
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3 9

Whether the Government Engaged in Outrageous Conduct by Running a Child
Pornography Website

Defendants could seemingly cherry pick language from the exclusionary
rule decisions for their arguments of outrageous government conduct
because, for a short time, the FBI became "the world's largest distributor
of child pornography and re-victimized countless children." 2 4 0 Despite
facilitating the distribution of over one million images of child
pornography to 100,000 visitors of Playpen in order to arrest, so far, 214
people,2 4 1 the claim of outrageous government conduct is almost predestined to fail, and the courts say as much.2 4 2 United States v. Russe/ 4 3
announced the rule that the government's conduct may be so outrageous
"due process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction .... "244 No district
court, however, felt distribution of child pornography on this scale to be
sufficiently shocking to warrant dismissal.2 4 5
E.

Discovey Issues Surrounding the Exploit Code of the Network Invest ative
Technique

Both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process
Clause mandate disclosure of evidence material to the guilt or punishment
of a defendant.2 4 6 Multiple defendants filed motions to compel discovery

239.

United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip op.

at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016).
240.

Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 36, United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-

RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016).

2016)

241.

See id. at 34-35 (proposing the ends of Operation Pacifier do not justify the means).

242.

See United States v. Tran, No. 16-10010-PBS, 2016 WL 7468005, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 28,

("Every district

court to consider this same argument has found it wanting."); United States v.

Owens, No. 16-CR-38-JPS, 2016 WL 7079617, slip op. at *4 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2016) (explaining
dismissal for outrageous government conduct does not exist in the Seventh Circuit); United States v.

Anzalone, 221 F. Supp. 3d 189, 193

(D. Mass. 2016) (finding no dismissals for outrageous

government conduct in the First Circuit); United States v. Chase, No. 5:15-CR-00015-RLV-DCK-1,

2016 WL 4639182, slip op. at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 6, 2016) (uncovering not a single case dismissed
for outrageous government conduct in the Fourth Circuit or Supreme Court).

243.
244.
245.

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
Id. at 431-32.
See Tran, 2016 WL 7468005, at *3 (citing other Playpen cases that denied dismissal for

outrageous government conduct).

246.

See United States v. McLamb, 220 F. Supp. 3d 663, 674 (E.D. Va. 2016) (citing FED. R.
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of the network investigative technique's source and programming
codes.2 4
Matish and United States v. McLam 4 8 denied the motions to
compel discovery. In Matish, the defendant asserted he needed access to
the NIT's exploit code in order to challenge the chain of custody
connecting his computer and Playpen, in addition to discovering if the
exploit altered his computer security settings, thus exposing him to a third249
The court felt the
party attack and possibly planting of evidence.
defendant rested his claims on speculation and far preferred testimony
from FBI Special Agent Alfin, who sat through two cross-examinations
and testified he "had no need to learn or study the exploit, as the exploit
does not produce any information but rather unlocks the door to the
information secured via the NIT."2 5 0 The court believed Agent Alfin's
claim that the defendants had nothing to gain from an examination of the
exploit code. Balanced against the government's legitimate need to keep
secret an important law enforcement tool used to track illegal contraband
online, the court easily found the defendant failed to meet his burden of
proof

251

The defendant in McLamb fared similarly to the defendant in Matish in
his request for the NIT's unique identifier generator and exploit code.
The court found his claims-that the code may have defaulted by creating
duplicate identifiers, the exploit could have performed outside the
warrant's scope, or the exploit could have harmed his security settingsunsupported by any evidence and too speculative to show materiality. 2 52
The defense in Michaud, on the other hand, won an order compelling
discovery of the exploit code. 2 53 During oral argument, the court agreed

CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E); then citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)) (denying defendants
motion to compel discovery because he failed to show materiality).
247.

See id. (requesting the "NIT exploit source code and the unique identifier generator" as

material to the defense); United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 592 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(acknowledging Defendants motion to compel discovery of the NIT source or programming code);
Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery at 1, United States v.

Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 11, 2015) (requesting "a copy
of the programming code for the 'Network Investigative Technique"' used against the defendant).

248.
249.

United States v. McLamb, 220 F. Supp. 3d 663 (E.D. Va. 2016).
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 592.

250.

Id. at 593-94.

251.

See id. (rejecting defendants claim regarding chain of custody at the same time).

252.

McLamb, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 674-75.

253.

See Order on Procedural History and Case Status in Advance of May 25, 2016 Hearing

at 1, United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-CR-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263 (W.D. Wash. May 18,
2016)

(addressing the "governments obligation to disclose the Network Investigative Technique
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with defense counsel's showing of materiality because
it comes down to a simple thing. You say you caught me by the use of
computer hacking, so how do you do it? How do you do it? A fair
question. And the government should respond under seal and under the
protective order, but the government should respond and say here's how we
did it.2 5 4
Despite the order, the government refused to disclose the NIT exploit,
and the court responded by excluding evidence resulting from the NIT
warrant. 2 5 5 The same judge reviewed similar discovery issues in United
States v. Tbpens,2 5 6 where defense counsel pressed at oral argument the
need to determine if the NIT operated outside of its permitted scope by
seizing unauthorized information. 2 " As defense counsel also stressed, the
exploit can do more than lock and unlock a computer like Agent Alfin
analogized, such as permanently removing security settings and altering
data.2 5 The judge ultimately ruled against Tippens' discovery motion.2 5
Although courts often defer to the knowledge and credibility of federal law
enforcement agents, even defenders of the NIT as a law enforcement tool
admit the FBI's description of their technology is "deliberately
deceptive." 2 6 0
The efforts by federal law enforcement to maintain
secrecy-both by sealing court documents and battling over discoveryhave had and will continue to have lasting negative effects on the justice
system.2 6 1

('N.I.T.

code'), a new investigative technology that has presented novel Due Process challenges").

254.

Id. at 2-3.

255. Order Denying Dismissal and Excluding Evidence at 1, United States v. Michaud,
No. 3:15-CR-05351-RJB-1, 2016 WL 337263 (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2016).

256.

United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2016).

257. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 71, United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016) (reminding the government the defendant is entitled to discovery
for pretrial motions).

258.

Id. at 71-72.

259.

Minute Entry for Proceedings Held Before Judge Robert J. Bryan-CRD, United States v.

Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016).
260. See Nicholas Weaver, Examining an FBI Hacking Warrant, LAWFARE (Mar. 16, 2016,
8:11 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/examining-fbi-hacking-warrant [https://perma.cc/N8CSMBWV] (pointing to Stingrays-cell site simulators-as another example of deceptive behavior by
the FBI, prompting the question: "Is it simply part of the FBI's DNA to attempt to deceive the
court?").
261.

See Consolidated Response to Govt Motion for Reconsideration; Response to Motions

for Ex Parte and In Camera Procs.; And Second Def. Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 22, United
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FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS TO SEARCH WARRANTS
BEYOND RULE 41(B)'s SCOPE

Following the enactment of Rule 41(b)(6), warrants of the type used in
Operation Pacifier will no longer face procedural hurdles, rather, the
substantial provisions of the Fourth Amendment serve as the only bar
between residents of the Western District of Texas being hacked into by
FBI agents in the Eastern District of Virginia based solely on a
magistrate's review.2 62 By its sheer scope and operation-uncovering
unknown people and locations-the Playpen warrant pushes the bounds
of particularity. 2 63 When not buoyed by a strong showing of probable
cause, serving to limit the ability of government agents to act on their own
direction, the requirement of particularity ought to increase. While crimes
like child pornography offer higher levels of probable cause by the very
nature of the crime-it being illegal to view such a pornographic imageother cyber-crimes provide less assurance.2 6 4 With precedent like the

States

v.

Michaud,

No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB,

2016 WL

337263

(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25,

2016)

(mentioning Stingray cases in which the government opted to dismiss charges rather than reveal their
technology).

262.

Cf Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 55, United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-

RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016)

(responding to government counsel that a Rule 41(b) violation

should fall back to the balance of the exclusionary rule, the court replied, "Arguably, to do that you
are throwing out Rule 41 and the Magistrate's Act and going right back to the Constitution and
saying well, this is a reasonable search, under the Constitution").

But see United States v. Krueger,

809 F.3d 1109, 1120 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (seeming to argue that rulemaking
bodies do not have the "authority to give magistrate judges any power exercisable anywhere the
rulemakers might choose to specify," which "would render Congress's express territorial limitations
pointless").
263.

The First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits did not directly address particularity.

See United

States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 322 (1st Cir. 2017) (finding the NIT warrant did not fall under a Leon
exception in that it was not so "akin to a general warrant and therefore so obviously lacking in
particularity that the officers' reliance on it amounted to bad faith") (citing United States v. Ninety-

Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137, 149 (3d Cir.
2002)); United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1049 n.3 (8th Cir. 2017) (declining to address
particularity because the court already found a constitutional violation in failure to abide by Rule 41);

United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1320 n.4 (10th Cir. 2017) ("Mr. Workman and the amicus
curiae also argue that the search was unconstitutional because the warrant lacked particularity.

But

Mr. Workman and the amicus curiae do not question the executing agents' objective reasonableness
in regarding the warrant as adequately particularized.").
264.

For example, online markets where illegal contraband is sold, such as the Silk Road, or

websites which host propaganda of radical Islamic terrorists. See Marcia G. Shein, Cyberrime and the
Fourth Amendment, THE CHAMPION, July 2016, at 36 (discussing Fourth Amendment issues in the
context of cybercrime "ranging from fraud, to internet hacking, to identity theft, to possession,
solicitation and distribution of child pornography and beyond").
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Playpen warrant, however, judges may get more comfortable shirking the
particularity requirement with weaker showings of probable cause.
A.

The Probable Cause and ParticularityRequirements of the FourthAmendment
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affinnation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.2 6 5

To be reasonable, a search requires a warrant supported by probable
cause that a crime occurred, and that evidence of the crime is in a
particular location.2 6 6 Law enforcement agents do not face a high bar to
show probable cause, the test being whether the affidavit supports a "fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place." 2 6 7
Reviewing courts give great deference to the
magistrate's rulings, which are reached using common sense reviews of the
totality of the circumstances. 2 6 8
Specificity of the warrant turns on particularity and breadth.2 6 9
Particularity means the warrant "suppl[ies] enough information to guide
and control the executing agent's judgment in selecting where to search
and what to seize . . .. "270 Overbroad warrants permit law enforcement
officers to seize items outside of the proper scope delineated by probable
cause. 2 7 1 Particularity means "nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant." 2 7 2

265.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

266.

See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 531-32 (E.D. Va. 2016) (ruling that

common sense suggests the number of steps required to land on the Playpen site, and the appearance
of either homepage image, reveal its criminal nature).

267.

United States v. Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d 236, 243 (D. Mass. 2016) (quoting United States

v. Rivera, 825 F.3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2016)).
268. Id.
269. See United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-CR-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, slip op. at *4
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (analyzing whether the NIT warrant lacks specificity to the point of being
an unconstitutional general warrant).

270.
2013).

Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 248 (quoting United States v. Kuc, 737 F.3d 129, 133 (1st Cir.

271.

Michaud, slip op. at *4.

272.

Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
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Probable Cause and ParticularityChallenges to the Paypen Search Warrant

In order to show probable cause of a crime, the Playpen website must
be so obviously related to the distribution of child pornography that
anyone who logged in did so intentionally to view or download child
pornography.2 "
The magistrate must decide, looking at the totality of
circumstances addressed in the affidavit, whether anyone could
accidentally land on the Playpen website without knowing, and
intentionally entering the site for purposes of viewing child
pornography.2 "
Defendants attempt to distinguish themselves from
other cases involving probable cause based on a paid membership to a
child pornography website, arguing Playpen did not require a fee. 2 7 5 In
addition, the appearance of the homepage plays a major role in deciding
whether the average person would assume, in accessing the site, that it is
criminal, which resulted in defendants stressing how the homepage image
changed between the affidavit's writing and submission.27
However, the
courts each pointed to other factors they found compelling to show
probable cause. 2"
For example, since Playpen operates on TOR as a
hidden service, visitors cannot find the web address through a traditional
search engine, but must seek out the address through other online
forums. 2 7
Upon reaching the homepage of Playpen, a message
prompted visitors to register, warning visitors not to use a real address or
post identifying information.2 "
From the foregoing, probable cause
192, 196 (1927)).
273. Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 244.
274.

See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 531-32 (E.D. Va. 2016) (arguing it is the

duty of the magistrate to decide whether a person could have innocently entered the website and
entered information without knowing the content of illegal images contained within).

275.

Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 244-45.

276.

Id. at 245.

277.

See United

States

v. Epich, No. 15-CR-163-PP, 2016 WL 953269,

slip op. at *1

(E.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2016) (calling the steps to reach Playpen "complicated machinations").
278.

See Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 241

(recognizing disagreements between defense

and

prosecution on how a defendant may have found Playpen's onion web address); Epich, slip op. at *1
(finding the steps taken to reach the site made it unlikely that unintentional users would "stumble
onto it").
279.

Compare Alain, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 241

("Playpen's

registration terms, which appeared

before users setup a username and password, gave further indication of Playpen's illicit purpose.
Prospective registrants were told that, 'the forum operators do NOT want you to enter a real [e-mail]
address,' that users 'should not post information [in their profile] that can be used to identify you,'
and that, '[t]his website is not able to see your IP."'), with Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 33,

United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016) ("But this warrant,
according to them on this probable cause, allowed them to search 100,000 people who just got to the
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existed to believe searching with a NIT would turn up evidence of child
pornography.2 8 0
Ensuring particularity in a mass computer hack proves more
complicated than probable cause. Defendants claim the NIT operates as
the "Internet age equivalent of a general warrant." 2 8 1 The warrant "gave
the FBI too much discretion, applied to too many users, and should have
been narrowed to authorize searches of only those site visitors who viewed
or downloaded illegal pornography, rather than broadly applying to any
visitors that logged into the site."" The court in United States v. Allain2 8
held, however, the number of computers a warrant authorizes to search is
irrelevant as long as probable cause exists to search each one.2 8 Pointing
to the search warrant, the court found limiting the NIT to "any user or
administrator who logs into [Playpen] by entering a username and
password" appropriately limited the places to be searched to those
evidencing probable cause of a crime, and then authorizing the seizure of a
few specific pieces of information sufficiently prevented agents from
relying on their own discretion.2 8
The magistrate's decision in United States v. CarlOn28 6 offers the only
opinion in which the warrant failed for particularity, 28 7 however the
Report and Recommendation was not adopted by the district court.2 8
Where other courts defined particularity based on the degree of probable
cause to limit agents in their search, and so any computer logging into
Playpen provides enough probable cause to be searched, Magistrate Judge
Noel finds a timing problem.2 8
The place to be searched can only be

home page, and they conceded that everything else in the home page, the technical language, that
would not have meant anything to the casual observer, and in fact, it's commonplace for sites like
Facebook.").

280. United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016).
281. Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 247.
282. Id.
283. United States v. Allain, 213 F. Supp. 3d 236 (D. Mass. 2016).
284. Id. at 247.
285. Id. at 242; accord United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-CR-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263,
slip op. at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) ("The NIT Warrant does not [] lack sufficient
specificity.").

286. United
States
v.
Carlson,
No. 16-317
(IRT/FLN),
2017 WL
1535995
(D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2017), adoptedin part and rejectedinpart, 2017 WL 3382309 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2017).
287. Id. at*11.
288.

Id. at *8 (rejecting the Report and Recommendation to the extent it grants the

defendant's motion to suppress).
289. Td. at *11.
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known after the search has already taken place. 2 9 0 "As there is no way to
identify at the time the search warrant was issued, which computers, out of
all the computers on planet earth might be used to log into the TARGET
WEBSITE, the NIT warrant fails to particularly describe the place to be
searched." 2 9 1 And although other courts might believe labeling the NIT
warrant as "anticipatory" salvages the unknown location of the activating
computers, Noel points out that anticipatory warrants must still provide
"probable cause to believe that evidence will be found at the particularly
described location, if the anticipated event occurs." 2 9 2 The failure to
identify with particularity the activating computers to be searched meant
the warrant only authorized a search within the Eastern District of
Virginia, and Carlson's computer in Minnesota was outside of the
warrant's scope. 2 9 3
IV.

CONCLUSION

A great divide separates the government's claim of "going dark:" 2 9 4 the
concern that programs like TOR and strong encryption create a "warrantproof' space, a space where criminals operate with impunity, and the
individual concern of being monitored every waking and sleeping moment
by our own devices. A crime like child pornography, universally reviled
and recognized for the extreme harm it causes, helps to loosen standards
of privacy by influencing balances made in the application of the
exclusionary rule, discovery requests, and the analysis of reasonable
expectations of privacy. It colors the tools that individuals use for
legitimate privacy purposes in order to operate outside of the
government's and other interlopers' watchful eyes. The probable cause
argument seems strong when analyzing child pornography offenses
perpetrated on the web, considering the nature of the websites that deal in
peer-to-peer distribution of child pornography. However, Leon and its
progeny have so watered down the need for probable cause and
particularity through the good-faith exception that evidence obtained
through other illegal operations involving mass hacking, perhaps facilitated
290.

Id.

291.

Id.

292.
293.
294.

Id. at *13.
Id. at *13.
Going Dark,

FBI,

https://www.fbi.gov/services/operational-technology/going-dark

[https://perma.cc/JL7J-AWDA] (describing the phenomenon the FBI seeks to combat with greater
surveillance powers).
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through a sympathetic magistrate, stand little chance of suppression. For
example, TorMail, an anonymous email service operated on TOR, suffered
a watering-hole attack, one in which malware automatically downloaded
and performed a search of individual computers, based on hitting the
home screen.2 9 5 Unsealed court documents show the FBI intended to
hack 300 particular email addresses associated with child pornography, but
for some reason, installed malware that hacked every TorMail user
indiscriminately.2 9 6 The FBI has been less than forthcoming about the
botched hack, but if it was an objective mistake, could the evidence be
suppressed? Could the NIT go hunting for evidence of a crime against the
originally unsuspected TorMail user?
Even in the face of proof that FBI agents, in consult with the DOJ,
knew about the facial deficiencies of the Playpen warrant, the good-faith
exception operated to salvage seized evidence and its fruit in most cases.
Although the Advisory Committee claimed the rule change only affected
procedure-that Fourth Amendment safeguards remain in place-the
Fourth Amendment, from a remedy standpoint, boils down to a balancing
test of society's desire to prosecute criminals, against the ability to deter
police misconduct. As one court put it, "[c]onsidering the unspeakable
harm caused by child pornography, and the creative and limited conduct
of the FBI that was undertaken to mitigate that harm, the Court has no
trouble concluding that suppression is entirely unwarranted here." 2 9 7
Despite the Fourth Amendment's very purpose of releasing criminals at
the cost of "the sanctity of the person, the home, and property against
unrestrained governmental power," 2 9 8 the courts now entertain hyped
rhetoric about the costs of letting criminals go free while failing to afford
the same deference to constitutional guarantees. Today hacking begins
with child pornography, but the newly minted Rule 41(b)(6), which the

295.

C. Aliens, New Documents Reveal the FBI May Have Hacked Evey TorMail User Illegally,

DEEPDOTWEB

(Nov. 16,

2016),

https://www.deepdotweb.com/2016/11/16/new-documents-

reveal-fbi-may-hacked-every-tormail-user-illegally/

[https://perma.cc/28XX-KJ3Y]

(documenting

efforts by the American Civil Liberties Union to unseal court documents after researchers discovered
malware

installed on a "Down for Maintenance" message displayed on every website hosted by

Freedom Hosting, including TorMail).

2 9 6.

Id.

297. United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip op.
at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (emphasis added).
298. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 941 n.8 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the

Exclusionary Ruk in Search-and-SeikureCases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1392-1393 (1983)).
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government consistently argued it could interpret flexibly, bears no
limitations on types of offenses. Law enforcement officers may request a
warrant from any magistrate judge within any district related to a crime to
search and seize electronic storage media and electronically stored
information in any other federal district as long as "the district where the
media or information is located has been concealed through technological
The Playpen opinions so far represent the general
means." 2 99
acquiescence to law enforcement agencies that act first and account later.
As far as motivations and deterrence, the FBI most likely feels incentivized
to use their new tool in new and unpredictable ways. The signaling from
courts to law enforcement about the Constitution ought to afford a bit
more than rhetorical hyperbole in the defense's corner. Decision-making
that keeps in mind the exceptional privacy implications of mass hacking
demands it. As one judge noted at the end of a hearing, "I have been at
this for .

.

. [forty-eight] years now, and there's some cases that come along

that make you feel inadequate, and this is one of them."3 0 0

299.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(A).

300.

Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 73, United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-

RJB-1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016).
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